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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Viranomaisyhteistyötä koskevaa tutkimusta tekevät yleensä viranomaistahot itse. Tutkimus 
kohdistuu pääasiallisesti heidän omaan toimintaansa, jolloin tarpeellisen tiedon tuottamisen 
lisäksi tutkimus sisältää mahdollista puolueellisuutta, eikä objektiivisuutta voida aina taata. 
Usein viranomaisyhteistyön tutkimus on myös käyttörajoitettua. Ulkopuolinen tutkija toden-
näköisesti pystyy tutkimaan aihetta objektiivisemmin koska ilmiöön ei liity samoja velvoit-
teita eikä rajoitteita. 
 
Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on tutkia miten eri viranomaistahot kokevat viranomaisyh-
teistyön Thor Libertyn tapauksessa. Tapaustutkimus kohdentuu viranomaisyhteistyön tarkas-
teluun, jossa oli mukana 15 viranomaistahoa, jotka hoitivat yhteistyössä 159 tonnin väärin-
pakatun räjähdeainelastin sekä 69 vientiluvattoman Patriot ohjuksen vaaratilanteen hallinnan 
sekä rikostutkinnan.  
 
Tutkimusaineisto kerättiin teemahaastatteluilla, jotka kohdistettiin kahdeksaan osallistunee-
seen viranomaistahoon. Haastateltavat edustivat seuraavia viranomaisia: Rajavartiolaitos, 
Tulli, Poliisi (vastuualueena yleinen järjestys ja turvallisuus), Poliisi (tutkinnanjohtaja), Kes-
kusrikospoliisi, Pelastustoimi, Trafi sekä HaminaKotkan satama. Haastattelut nauhoitettiin ja 
litteroitiin, ja litteroitu aineisto analysoitiin fenomenografialla.  
  
Tutkimustulokset osoittavat viranomaisyhteistyön toimivan Suomessa hyvin. Toimivuus pe-
rustuu luottamukseen, johon vaikuttavat viranomaisten tuttuus, yhdenvertaisina toimiminen 
sekä diskurssi. Vaikka tulokset osoittavat että viranomaisyhteistyötä voidaan parantaa, koh-
distuvat mahdolliset parannusehdotukset lähinnä yhteistyön jatkokehittämiseen ja toiminnan 
edelleen parantamiseen. Tutkimuksen tuloksena voidaan todeta muun muassa, että monivi-
ranomaistilanteet voitaisiin käsitellä yhdessä kaikkien osallisten tahojen kanssa jälkikäteen. 
Tällöin voitaisiin keskustella ja paremmin ymmärtää miksi ja miten eri tavoin sama tilanne 
nähdään ja käsitetään. Viranomaisten organisaatioiden eri tasot voisivat myös osallistua yh-
teistoimintaharjoituksiin, jolloin ymmärrys toimintaan viranomaisyhteistyötilanteessa vahvis-
tuisi. Lisäksi, uusien ihmisten mukaantuloa ja perehdyttämistä harjoitus- ja yhteistoimintaan 
voisi helpottaa paitsi hiljaisen tiedon, myös luottamuksen riittävällä siirtämisellä seuraajalle.   
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ABSTRACT 
Research on interagency cooperation is usually undertaken by authorities and agencies, fo-
cusing on their own area of authority and interest. While this provides good information for 
the individual agency, it may also give rise to bias in the outcome. In addition, the research 
results and reports are often restricted. Therefore, a researcher outside an agency might be 
able to focus on the research from an unbiased perspective and evaluate the phenomenon 
without liability issues. 
 
The objective of this study is to understand how different agencies perceive interagency co-
operation. Case study research is used as a research strategy to focus on the interagency co-
operation phenomenon. The Thor Liberty incident is a good example on a multiagency coop-
eration situation and provides excellent material for a case study. The Thor Liberty incident 
involved fifteen entities cooperating to resolve the wrongly stowed 159 tons of explosives 
and 69 Patriot missiles without required export permits in Finland in 2011.  
 
The research data were collected from thematic interviews. Eight interviews were conducted 
with participants presenting as many participating agencies involved in the Thor Liberty in-
cident: The Finnish Border Guard, the Finnish Customs, the local Police, the Police’s Chief 
Inspector, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Fire and Rescue Department, The Finn-
ish Transport Safety Agency Trafi and the Port of HaminaKotka. The recorded and tran-
scribed interviews were analyzed using phenomenography. 
 
The research results suggest that the Finnish interagency cooperation works well due to fa-
miliarity, working as peers, and discourse, while the foundation for it is trust. Even though 
there is room for improvement it only concerns further developing the cooperation. The main 
conclusion is that when the requirement for multi-agency cooperation arises, effective inter-
agency communication is required to understand and to be aware of the potential differences 
in perceptions and expectations of personnel in each agency. In addition, different hierar-
chical levels within each agency could participate in shared exercises, which would lead to 
better mutual understanding of the requirements of the situation. Finally, new personnel 
should be integrated into the interagency cooperation to ensure tacit information and trust, 
which appears to be shared similarly, are passed on sufficiently. 
Key Words: Interagency cooperation, Thor Liberty, situation coordination, four-fold typolo-
gy on Leadership, phenomenography 
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INTERAGENCY COOPERATION – A PHENOMENOGRAPHIC STUDY 
OF THE THOR LIBERTY CASE 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Interagency cooperation is both easy and challenging. It is easy since cooperating with experts 
from another area of expertise can be meaningful, dependable and straight forward. People, 
however, create challenges as they think, act and operate differently, and approach the shared 
cases with a different agenda. While the necessity for interagency cooperation is acknowl-
edged, it usually requires many aspects to come together: will, mutual trust and a reason 
amongst others. In general, the will and trust to cooperate are usually self-evident, but they 
are also individual traits and depend on the people involved in a case. Both the need and the 
reason arise in shared operations, which are complex and fall under several authorities’ juris-
dictions. However, the differences in the jurisdictions may also lead to misinterpretations, 
miscommunication, and differences in opinion in the approach on what to do in the case. In-
deed, as with any operation, organization or incident where many entities are involved, there 
usually are different opinions and approaches as to what to do, what factors should be priori-
tized and what has to be taken into account.  
Interagency cooperation takes place when two or more agencies are working together on a 
shared case or agenda. It is regulated by law and is undertaken on all levels: from the minis-
tries and administrative level down to the operational level. On the operational level, one 
agency assumes the overall situation command, and the responsibility depends on the relevant 
laws. The goal of the overall situation command is to confirm that all joint action is coordi-
nated, and that people’s safety is taken into account without compromising the possible evi-
dence.  
In Finland, interagency cooperation has a long tradition. It is undertaken at all levels, and in 
the government it has its own concept: Comprehensive Security1, as defined in the Security 
Strategy for Society2. The framework for interagency cooperation is in the legislation, which 
both gives power and obliges authorities to support each other with special skills, resources 
and capabilities. After all, one reason for cooperation between agencies is to save money, and 
to use scarce, and difficult or expensive-to-maintain resources as efficiently as possible. In 
addition to interagency cooperation, executive assistance is also a form of cooperation, but the 
                                                 
1The comprehensive security model involves the whole nation in making security: The government and authori-
ties, the private sector, the voluntary organizations i.e. NGO’s, and the general public. 
2 Ministry of Defence 2010. 
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legislation behind it differs significantly. Executive assistance is tied to time, place and opera-
tion, and involves cumbersome administrative tasks. Regardless of the respective differences 
in the relevant legislations, the Interagency cooperation –term covers also executive assis-
tance in this thesis. 
This thesis focuses on interagency cooperation of the Finnish security authorities on an opera-
tional level. While studies and reports on the subject in Finland exists, they are usually not 
public. Mr. Vesa Valtonen’s dissertation3 is the basic research on how interagency coopera-
tion works in Finland, and the only publicly available academic study. As a consequence, this 
thesis builds on concepts and processes identified in his research. However, while Valtonen’s 
dissertation studied interagency cooperation of the security authorities in general, this thesis 
focuses specifically on interagency cooperation in the Thor Liberty case. 
The Thor Liberty case took place in 2011-2012 and began when a cargo ship Thor Liberty 
docked in the port of HaminaKotka (also known as Mussalo harbor) in December 2011. The 
stevedores discovered cardboard boxes and their spilled contents in the cargo hold with signs 
indicating explosives attached to the boxes. The stevedores called in the first authorities, and 
after a few days in the operation to prevent a large scale emergency, a total number of 69 
ground-to-air Patriot air defence missiles were discovered. More authorities joined in the op-
eration after the discovery of the missiles, and a criminal investigation operation began. In 
total 15 authorities took part in the Thor Liberty case between December 15th 2011 and Janu-
ary 6th 2012.  
In any multi-agency cooperation situation, there are several jurisdictions, some of which are 
overlapping with one another. Regardless of this complication, the situation needs manage-
ment and coordination, as governed by the legislation. Prevention of a large-scale emergency 
situation was managed by the Fire and Rescue Department, and the criminal investigation by 
the authorities with powers for preliminary investigation. Interagency cooperation on a similar 
scale does happen occasionally, however the Thor Liberty case had some unique features: it 
took place in Kotka4, which meant that the preliminary preventive action was seen to mainly 
by the local authorities. The incident was far more serious than what they were accustomed to 
handle and this is evident in their interviews5. In addition to the scale, also the media coverage 
on the Thor Liberty case was extensive by both national and international media agencies. 
                                                 
3 Valtonen 2010. 
4 A city at the shoreline some 100 kilometers from Helsinki. 
5 Interview with the Fire and Rescue Department representative; Interview with the Trafi representative. 
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The local authorities managed the situation well but admitted that they faced a new situation 
and needed to adjust their existing knowledge accordingly.  
Research on interagency cooperation often faces challenges with publicity. The operational 
work conducted by the authorities, and the majority of related reports, are restricted under the 
Act on the Openness of Government Activities6. Therefore, to conduct this case study, addi-
tional measurements had to be taken into account in order to verify that no restricted or classi-
fied information is disclosed in this thesis. This process is of vital importance as my intention 
is to make it publicly available, especially since there are not many public studies on inter-
agency cooperation in Finland. Details of this approach are fully described in chapter 6.1. 
This thesis is done for the Department of Management and Leadership in the Finnish National 
Defence University. Interagency cooperation is one of the three tasks for the Finnish Defence 
Forces, as dictated by legislation7. Studying in the interagency cooperation master’s pro-
gramme it is integral to understand the interagency cooperation as a phenomenon. In refer-
ence to the wide media coverage on the Thor Liberty case, I also followed the reporting inten-
sively. The objective of this study is to understand how the participants perceive interagency 
cooperation. The Thor Liberty incident is a good example on a multiagency cooperation situa-
tion and provides excellent material for a case study. Moreover, as all participants have dif-
ferent perceptions on what happened and why, a logical choice for analyzing the interviews 
was phenomenography, which aims to understand the differences in perceptions. 
This thesis consists of 6 chapters. The first chapter will introduce the substance and explain 
the aim of this thesis. Chapter two (2) introduces the theoretical background and previous 
research on interagency cooperation and leadership. Methodological choices are described 
and explained in chapter three (3). Chapter four (4) begins with the case study on the situation 
where the multi-agency cooperation took place, and continues with details of the phenomeno-
graphical analysis of the data that was collected from the interviews. Discussion is found in 
chapter five (5) and conclusion, critique and further research topics are detailed in chapter six 
(6). 
 
 
                                                 
6 Laki viranomaistoiminnan julkisuudesta 621/1999. 
7 Laki puolustusvoimista 551/2007 § 2 2.  
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2 LEADERSHIP, COOPERATION AND BEYOND 
This chapter first describes the research problem. Then, it goes through how interagency co-
operation has been previously studied. With the relevant theories and definitions from the 
research the theoretical background of this study is then presented. The last section focuses 
and outlines the Finnish interagency cooperation on a general level, and then concentrates on 
situation coordination.  
 
2.1 Research question 
Coordination and cooperation are tools for leadership. On an organizational level, leadership 
is indicated by the status and position within the organization. However, in situations where 
several organizations are involved in a common project, leadership becomes a management 
task of the cooperation. The authorities can take roles with equal responsibilities, forming a 
management board, where the commanding officers from all participating organizations act as 
experts or consultants and then delegate the tasks to appropriate levels within their own or-
ganizations. However, to be able to delegate the tasks the management board needs to come to 
a consensus. As the board assembles the participants will have initial expectations on the case. 
Based on the expectations each agency forms a perception of the respective responsibilities  
This thesis’ research question is How interagency cooperation worked in the Thor Liberty 
Case?. It investigates the interagency cooperation phenomenon based on the perceptions of 
the personnel within each of the agencies involved with the Thor Liberty incident. These 
agencies are: The Finnish Border Guard, the Finnish Customs, the local Police, the Police’s 
Chief Inspector, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Fire and Rescue Department, The 
Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi and the Port of HaminaKotka. An additional request 
was sent to the Finnish Defence Forces, but they did not participate in the interviews. 
The goal of this thesis is to understand how interagency cooperation works by comparing the 
differences in perceptions of the personnel at the participating agencies. The thematic inter-
views concentrate on leadership, coordination, communication, preparedness and mutual trust.  
While this thesis could be used as a “Lessons Learned” case study or an overview on issues 
that could be improved, this is not the intention. The purpose of this study is to raise aware-
ness of issues that may arise in situations such as the Thor Liberty incident. This requires un-
derstanding of what happened, how cooperation worked between the different agencies and 
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entities, and how the perceptions of the personnel involved differed from one another. If the 
participating entities want to use this thesis to improve their reciprocal cooperation and coor-
dination, they will do it according to their own interest.  
 
2.2 Previous research 
Leadership and management are present in all organizations, and are a widely studied phe-
nomenon in a variety of disciplines. According to Hannele Seeck’s book Johtamisopit Su-
omessa8, the roots of leadership and management in Finland are with Frederick Taylor’s theo-
ry on Scientific Management, and in the military. Seeck has been studying how leadership 
theories circulated to Finland and refers to9 Aki-Mauri Huhtinen’s article10, where the military 
education is seen as a significant contributor on how and what theories are taught. Military 
plays a significant role in Finland because of the mandatory conscript service to all men 
where everyone is being lead. Some also receive leadership training. Due to the military being 
a central contributor in the Finnish leadership training, I will use the fourfold typology on 
leadership that is thought in the Finnish Defence Forces, and has been scientifically studied.  
Cooperation and especially its concept has been studied in many disciplines. The relevant 
ones for this thesis are Leena Paukkunen’s dissertation Development of Collaborative Compe-
tence in Social and Health Care11, and Vesa Valtonen’s dissertation Collaboration of Security 
Actors – an Operational-Tactical Perspective12. Paukkunen studies how teaching in a cross-
sectoral environment helps cooperation in social and health care. Due to her approach on how 
the studied people’s different backgrounds affect cooperation her dissertation is relevant to 
my thesis, because my case study also presents cooperation of people from different back-
grounds, or in this case organizations. Paukkunen’s research will be further discussed in chap-
ter 2.4. Valtonen’s dissertation’s relevance has two dimensions: he has made a comprehensive 
concept analysis on cooperation of security actors, and his research is the ground work for 
studying interagency cooperation.  
As stated previously, Valtonen’s dissertation is the only academic research conducted on in-
teragency cooperation in Finland. He focuses on interagency cooperation between the security 
authorities in Finland, and begins with a concept analysis on cooperation. One of the key find-
                                                 
8 Seeck 2008. 
9 Seeck 2008. 20. 
10 Huhtinen 2006, 207. 
11 Paukkunen 2003. 
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ings is that despite cooperation being studied in many disciplines, interagency cooperation at 
an operational level is not13. Valtonen also states that many times in interagency cooperation 
research the end-result and / or the research data is classified.14 I also noticed the same issue 
when searching for other similar studies: the case study in my thesis is not the only incident 
with interagency cooperation15, which means that the other research or reports are not public-
ly available. The publicity of this thesis is further discussed in section 6.1.  
Even though Valtonen’s research is the only relevant dissertation in terms of interagency co-
operation in Finland, it has also been studied in many theses and other research papers. They 
are produced mainly at the agency’s own colleges or schools, which might create biases and 
certainly limits the perspective to answering their own needs. These are the Emergency Ser-
vices College that researches the Rescue Department’s operations and cases, and the Police 
University College, which studies the Police. Also the Finnish Border Guard’s Border and 
Coast Guard Academy concentrates on borders and border security issues. The Finnish Na-
tional Defence University has produced some studies that seek to understand interagency co-
operation at the governmental level, but concentrate greatly on how the military cooperates 
and supports the civilian authorities. As candidates and masters theses are seen as a proof of 
learning rather than academic research, they are mainly excluded from the references. How-
ever, the most relevant ones regarding interagency cooperation and interagency cooperation 
between the security authorities are included in this section. 
The Defence University’s publication Yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi 56: Joukko ehdotuksia Puo-
lustusvoimain tulevaisuuteen 203016 briefly discusses interagency cooperation. As Valtonen’s 
dissertation, also this study states that it is a hard and complex entity to study, as it is cross-
sectoral and interdisciplinary.17 While the study discusses the same issues what Valtonen dis-
covered in his thesis, it also states that the two major flaws in the study of the interagency 
cooperation phenomenon are the ambiguity of the concepts and the practical cooperation in 
field is hindered by inadequate guidance. The latter may result into failure of using the scarce 
resources as efficiently as possible18.  
                                                                                                                                                        
12 Valtonen 2010.  
13 Valtonen 2010, 21. 
14 Valtonen 2010, 69. 
15 The Myyrmanni bombings in 2002; The school shootings in Jokela (2007) and in Kauhajoki (2008); The 
shopping center Sello shooting in 2009; etc.  
16 Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 2014. 
17 Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 2014, 3. 
18 Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 2014, 3. 
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Lauri Holappa’s master’s thesis Viranomaisyhteistyön johtaminen suuronnettomuustilanteis-
sa19 concentrates on the coordination of interagency cooperation in a large-scale accident. He 
focused on the coordination of Fire and Rescue Department, analyzing how it was conducted 
in three rescue situation cases. His main conclusions were that coordination plays a crucial 
role in all levels, including the administrative level. His other main result was that role of 
shared exercises is significant, and that a sufficient amount of preparedness and resources 
should be allocated in interagency cooperation. 
Anssi Munkki’s Post-graduate thesis Merivoimat ja viranomaisten tukeminen 203020 studies 
how the Finnish Navy’s cooperation and support for other authorities should be developed to 
meet the 2030’s operational environment. He uses a Delphi-method to construct a comprehen-
sive understanding of what the operational environment will look like from interagency coop-
eration’s viewpoint. Munkki concludes that interagency cooperation will play a key role in 
constructing and maintaining security. He points out that developing interagency cooperation 
will have to be actively furthered, but that also the local and environmental aspects have to be 
considered in the development work.  
Internationally there are some academic research on interagency cooperation. Many of them, 
like Usman Hameed’s dissertation21 Mandatory obligations under the international counter-
terrorism and organised crime conventions to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement 
approaches cooperation from a very different angle. Hameed focuses on the international law 
that directs interagency cooperation on international and national level concentrating mainly 
on terrorism and organized crime. While the topic is interesting the study focuses only on the 
Police, and thus is not relevant to my study due to my scope with eight different agencies.  
Another example of interagency cooperation research is Christine Hallett’s dissertation22. Her 
thesis’ title is A case study of interagency coordination in child protection services, and she 
approaches cooperation from the health care sector’s point of view. As Hallett, also my thesis 
is a case study on a specific case, which creates a good focus on the research. However, her 
dissertation is not relevant to my thesis as I focus on interagency cooperation from many dif-
ferent sectors while she focuses on child protection services.  
                                                 
19 Holappa 2015.  
20 Munkki 2009.  
21 Hameed 2014. 
22 Hallett 1993. 
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In addition to dissertations, the EU agencies have also published some reports on interagency 
cooperation. A good example is the Study for the LIBE committee23 that was published in 
2014. The title is The inter-agency cooperation and future architecture of the EU criminal 
justice and law enforcement area24 and the main objective is to establish interagency coopera-
tion between different EU agencies works and how it could be improved. The study is im-
portant on the EU-level, and certainly is useful for the national authorities. However, while 
the study concentrates on the decentralized agencies, the cooperation amongst them cannot be 
compared to the national institutions which are in my interest. Hence, that study is not rele-
vant to my thesis. 
All in all, there are no similar research available in public than my thesis. A similar setting 
might not be available, but other research with multiagency cooperation could have been in-
teresting. The lack of such research suggests that it is either not a widely studied subject, or 
that the data cannot be publicized. While this is merely a master’s thesis and as such does not 
contribute to the academic discussion per se, it could be used as an example on how inter-
agency cooperation could be studied.  
 
2.3 Leadership 
Leadership can mean a variety of things. One of the most clear and simple definitions is what 
also Linda Smircich and Gareth Morgan have used, leadership is interaction between the 
leader and the lead25. A more complex definition was provided by Hannele Seeck: leadership 
can be defined as performance with which someone’s effort and resources can be efficiently 
acquired, allocated and utilized in order to achieve a set goal26. Seeck’s definition is also used 
by the Finnish Defence Forces, where the objective is to get individuals with different back-
grounds, ranks and influential power to work together to achieve the set goals27. Indeed, there 
are several different approaches and the presented three are merely a drop in the sea. 
The Finnish Defence Forces and the National Defence University28 use a four-fold typology 
of leadership as the ground for studying and teaching leadership. The four approaches are 
                                                 
23 Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. 
24 European Parliament 2014.  
25 Smircich & Morgan 1982, 258. 
26 Seeck 2008, 20. 
27 Johtamisen käsikirja 2012, 12. 
28 Kiuru 2009, 18.; Huhtinen 2006, 45-49. etc. 
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management, leadership, organizational cultures and organizational structures. This structure 
is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: The fourfold typology of Leadership 
 
Leadership means leading people, and approaching people on a personal level. Leaders are 
interested and conscious on how things are ordered and also on the needs and wellbeing of the 
subordinates. Management is about coordination and managing issues, such as time tables and 
administration. Managers concentrate on the clarity of the message / order, and that it is given 
on time. Organizational culture defines how things are done in an organization and affects the 
perceptions of the people in that organization, whereas organizational structures define the 
management relations such as hierarchies, and is closely related to jurisdiction.29  
Even though the idea of the four-fold typology is to study leadership from different aspects, 
they are still all interdependent with one another. According to Huhtinen, the interdependence 
comes from the development of leadership and organizational thinking, and correlates with 
how the perception on people and work develop30. Mika Aalto argues31 that dividing actual 
leadership into four field is artificial, as a good leader knows (or should know) how to balance 
the different traits. However, as means of studying the four-fold typology works well as it 
                                                 
29 E.g. Kiuru 2009. 
30 Huhtinen 2006, 27. 
31 Aalto 2012, 133. 
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emphasizes the different aspects of leadership that should be taken into account when learning 
what leadership is, and implementing it to how it is done. 
As disclosed earlier, the four-fold typology is very interdependent with one another, and has 
been criticized for it. Mika Aalto ponders the reason why and suggests another way of ap-
proaching it. As leadership and its context are inseparable, there are certain approaches that 
have to be emphasized in order to succeed in leading. Aalto perceives the division at two ends 
of a line: organizational structure and organizational culture on one end, and management and 
leadership on the other. The former end is perceived as stabile, as the context, whereas the 
latter end may be influenced by the leader.32 Indeed, the organizational culture and organiza-
tional structures are constant and form the context in which management and leadership are 
done.  
Leadership requires understanding the context. In my opinion, to ensure that the context is 
properly taken into account it requires skill, experience and intuition. This is supported by the 
idea that people grow into leadership rather than intuitively having that quality or skill33. In 
other words, experience is a significant factor in leadership, especially in a complex, multia-
gency cooperation situation, as was the Thor Liberty case.  
According to Linda Smircich and Gareth Morgan34  
…the concept and practice of leadership… … [is] so powerfully ingrained into 
popular thought that the absence of leadership is often seen as absence of or-
ganization.35  
Linda Smircich and Gareth Morgan 
This direct quote from Smircich’s and Morgan’s paper is an interesting approach. They claim 
that the absence of leadership is like living, working or operating without structure. Moreover, 
this though can be implemented into interagency cooperation, as the organizations work to-
gether, structure is needed to enable the cooperation to function. Yet, as many of the inter-
viewees stated, leadership in between the involved authorities was coordination rather than 
anything else. I endorse this view since the cooperative functions were agreed upon in the 
managerial meetings of the management board.  
                                                 
32 Aalto 2012, 137 - 138. 
33 E.g. Johtajan käsikirja 2012, 23, 26, 29.; Markkula 2011, 26.  
34 Smircich & Morgan 1982.  
35 257. 
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However, according to Valtonen, coordination between the security authorities is seen as the 
preliminary process for interagency cooperation. Again, interagency cooperation has been 
included in Valtonen’s term Collaboration of Security Actors36, which is the core factor in the 
cooperation between authorities. To conclude, leadership is a key element the lack of it cre-
ates uncertainty. Leadership in interagency cooperation appears as coordination, which is also 
Valtonen’s dissertation’s conclusion, albeit simplified.  
 
2.4 Cooperation 
Cooperation has been studied since Charles Darwin37 from many perspectives and in many 
fields of research. Although it would be reasoned to discuss the origins and how cooperation 
is seen by many disciplines, a general overview is sufficient for this thesis.  
Martin A. Nowak38 has studied the evolution of cooperation. He presents five different rules 
on why people – or any living organism – cooperate in a competitive world. These five rea-
sons are kin selection (cooperating with relatives), direct reciprocity (immediate gain for all 
participants), indirect reciprocity (random acts of kindness or help to gain a good reputation, 
and thus get help from other strangers.), network reciprocity (cooperating in a community 
with the people in your network to succeed) and group selection (helping one another in a 
group to succeed as a group).39 Nowak concludes his study in claiming that cooperation 
should be seen as the third fundamental principle of evolution beside mutation and natural 
selection, as it is a significant method of survival and prosper. In short, cooperation is needed 
to succeed regardless of the reasons behind it. 
The natural history of cooperation exemplifies how primal action cooperation is also amongst 
humans. Cooperation is a standard method both in an individual level as well as on an organ-
izational level. Many different forms of it is studied such as strategic partnerships or strategic 
alliances, which occur at the organizational level. Mitchell Koza and Arie Lewin, for exam-
ple, have studied how strategic partnerships increase the odds of success40 by cooperative 
competition. The main idea is to form alliances so that firms gain a variety of benefits, such 
as market power also on new market areas, acquiring technology, skills or resources, or shar-
                                                 
36 247–248.  
37 Pennisi 2009, 1196.; Nowak 2006, 1. 
38 Nowak 2006. 
39 Nowak 2006, 6. 
40 Koza & Lewin 2000. 
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ing high-risk research projects41. Regardless of the importance of the strategic alliance re-
search is, it is not comparable to interagency cooperation, as the authorities do not cooperate 
to gain profit, but to be able to conduct the necessary tasks. 
Another research area of cooperation happens within an organization. It appears in teams or 
sections. For example, Knut Pipping studied group phenomenon during the World War II, 
and wrote his ground breaking dissertation Infantry Company as a Society after the war. His 
sociological study focuses on the formal and informal organization in the Finnish wartime 
army.42 Interagency cooperation could be studied as a sociological phenomenon, but it is not 
the objective of this study. Also, in the Thor Liberty case the involved authorities did not 
form a group per se, but rather an executive management board, where decisions on the ac-
tions were made in consensus, and the actions were executed with their sectors.  
In addition to the previously mentioned strategic partnerships and team work with group phe-
nomenon, another form of teams exists. They are usually referred to as the ad hoc teams or 
temporary teams, which is a very figurative term. These teams are formed either suddenly – 
ad hoc – to complete a task or to respond to a situation. They can also be temporary because a 
project has an end-date, after which the team is no longer needed43. According to, for exam-
ple, René M. Bakker, Smaranda Boros, Patrick Kenis and Leon A.G. Oerlemans this tempo-
rary team model is popular especially on knowledge-intensive industries44. The temporary 
teams cannot be directly compared with interagency cooperation since these teams have a 
deadline before which the project has to be completed, and the time pressure affects the 
team’s dynamics45. The authorities are not restricted by time and will take the time they need. 
The temporality of the authorities cooperation emerges from the task itself: regardless of the 
time it takes to solve whatever issue the case is about, the cooperation as such will end even-
tually.  
As already mentioned earlier, Leena Paukkunen’s dissertation46 provides an interesting ap-
proach to cooperation. She studied teaching in a cross-sectoral environment, and how it helps 
cooperation in social and health care. She claims that teamwork competence is a learned 
practice47, and means that students learn skills and competences in a group where the mem-
bers are from different backgrounds. The provided tools for learning together were group 
                                                 
41 Koza & Lewin 2000, 146–147. 
42 Pipping 2008. 
43 Bakker, Boros, Kenis, & Oerlemans 2013, 391. 
44 Bakker et. al. 2013, 384.  
45 Ibid. 383. 
46 Paukkunen 2003. 
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reflection activities and multi-discipline and contextual learning, where emphasis was put on 
group discussions. The discussions reflected on what was learned individually and in groups, 
resulting into an understanding on different perceptions of the same issue, and tolerance and 
understanding on different views.48 These skills make the premises for cooperation, which 
needs practice and experience. By means of discussion the different views can be used by 
everyone in the group, widening their thinking and developing reasoning. Similarly, experi-
ence enables interagency cooperation: The different backgrounds of the involved authorities’ 
affect on how the shared case is perceived, and with discussing the situation may be analyzed 
to bring forth the best option on how to proceed.  
As presented in this chapter, cooperation can be studied as a phenomenon in many different 
context. It has been stated after each paragraph why they cannot be compared with interagen-
cy cooperation, which in itself is a relatively exceptional way of cooperating. Only Pauk-
kunen’s approach on learning from one another appears to serve the interagency cooperation 
phenomenon.  
 
2.5 Interagency cooperation in Finland 
Valtonen also discusses the terminology and meaning of cooperation. However, in this thesis 
the focus is not on the terminology, but the contents or the operational cooperation – how co-
operation is done and why. Before focusing on interagency the term has to be defined. Given 
that this thesis concentrates on studying interagency cooperation between authorities in a joint 
case or operation, I will apply Valtonen’s definition:  
Collaboration of security actors means concrete collaboration between security 
authorities, which is based on a joint decision, agreement or other such ar-
rangement.49  
Vesa Valtonen 
Valtonen states that not all traits of cooperation can be applied to the cooperation of security 
authorities, since many times cooperation is done due to necessity rather than something else. 
Again, as all participating entities in this case study are, or were in 2011, authorities, inter-
agency cooperation is defined by Valtonen: 
                                                                                                                                                        
47 Paukkunen 2003, 47. 
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Interagency cooperation is joint action between authorities, obliged parties and 
authorized parties coordinated by competent authorities in order to achieve 
common goals. This means that, for example, power play amongst the partici-
pants is irrelevant as it is defined in the legislation or with agreements.50  
Vesa Valtonen 
Interagency cooperation is based on legislation, with the fundamentals coming from the Con-
stitutional law § 2 351. The authorities’ tasks are to implement the law, provide public services 
and where necessary, use public power against individuals and entities. The authorities’ juris-
diction, laid down in the legislation, provides the framework on what the authorities are al-
lowed and obliged to do. This also means that any authority cannot transfer their tasks to an-
other entity if it has not been defined by the relevant legislation.52 There are also some over-
lapping jurisdictions such as with powers of preliminary investigations or coercive measures, 
which can be performed by the Police, the Customs or the Border Guard.  
Kari T. Takamaa discusses in his article Oikeus, laki ja johtaminen53 how the legislation is to 
be used when defining which authority is responsible for the overall situation in a multiagen-
cy cooperation situation. He states that the leader has to be aware of the jurisdiction and their 
boundaries that create the framework in which the overall situation leadership54 takes place.55 
Takamaa concludes his article stating that studying leadership requires understanding also 
the legal framework of the situation itself.  
Legislation provides only one aspect of how interagency cooperation works. It defines the 
protocol on how and what sort of assistance one authority may provide to the other, and it 
separates two legal terms: Interagency cooperation and executive assistance. Interagency co-
operation is administrative56 and is defined above in this thesis’ context, but the definition for 
executive assistance means:  
A situation where one authority assists another by using its jurisdiction in a 
way, that the other authority could execute their tasks. It requires that the task 
                                                                                                                                                        
48 Paukkunen 2003, e.g. 82, 84, 92. 
49 Valtonen 2010, Appendix 1. Note, translation made by the author. 
50 Valtonen 2010, Appendix 1. Note, translation made by the author. 
51 Perustuslaki 731/1999. 
52 Sisäministeriö 2015, 3-4. 
53 Takamaa 2006. As published in Huhtinen 2006.  
54 Overall situation management means the responsible authority dependent by the situation at hand and defined 
in the law. 
55 Takamaan 2006, 176 – 177. 
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for which executive assistance is requested is defined, including the definition of 
time, place, duration, resources and equipment.57  
Ministry of the Interior 
In practice, however, executive assistance and interagency cooperation mean the same, and 
will be addressed both when talked about interagency cooperation in this thesis.  
According to Valtonen’s research, one possible criteria for interagency cooperation is cost-
effectiveness58. Even though his research indicated it is not the most relevant criteria on the 
operational level, I see it as relevant to address briefly. Cost-effectiveness is not the reason 
why authorities cooperate locally, but it is in-built into the administrative structures. This 
though was brought up by the interviewees from the Finnish Border Guard. There is no need 
to acquire overlapping capacity in terms of resources, know-how and equipment, as they are 
relatively easily available via interagency cooperation or executive assistance. For example, 
the Finnish Border Guard and the Finnish Defence Forces are the only authorities who have 
helicopters. However, due to the cooperative structure they are used for Search and Rescue 
operations both land and sea, extinguishing forest fires and also for airlifting of medical pa-
tients59.  
The Finnish authorities cooperate with one another frequently, and some do it on daily bases. 
In fact, the Police, the Customs and the Border Guard have formed a model of cooperating to 
combat crime. The cooperation is based on law. According to the act:  
A PCB [Police, Customs Border Guard, writer’s note] authority may, on re-
quest, carry out a measure relating to the combating of crime on behalf of an-
other PCB authority in the area of responsibility of the PCB authority in ques-
tion, using the powers that it may use in its own crime-combating tasks in its ar-
ea of responsibility60. 
Laki poliisin, tullin ja rajavartiolaitoksen yhteistoiminnasta 
This is but one example on how interagency cooperation can be done to prevent crimes. How-
ever, in a more complex situations such as the Thor Liberty case, there were many authorities 
                                                                                                                                                        
56 Sisäministeriö 2015, 11.  
57 Sisäministeriö 2015, 11. 
58 Valtonen 2010, e.g. 187, 193–195. 
59 Rajavartiolaitos 2016. 
60 Laki poliisin, tullin ja rajavartiolaitoksen yhteistoiminnasta 687/2009 § 2. 
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present whose cooperation are scarce61. Juhani Kivelä claims in his dissertation Hiljainen 
hälytys62 that the legislation for aforementioned PCB cooperation has proved to be success-
ful63. In contrast, the other authorities whose own laws regulate on interagency cooperation 
would also benefit from similar compound laws.  
In my view, interagency cooperation is also the key to local preparedness planning. In addi-
tion to the preparedness made by the government64, all municipalities should prepare for 
emergencies together with the local authorities. Juhani Kivelä’s dissertation provides a good 
overview on how it should be done. He has made a comprehensive empirical research by in-
terviewing over 100 people, who represent different authorities that are responsible for pre-
paredness planning in Finland. They represent the administrative level, the regions and mu-
nicipalities and also relevant authorities, such as the Police and the Fire and Rescue Depart-
ments, to name a few. Even though the structure for preparedness planning seems relatively 
clear as all agencies have their own areas of responsibility, the common coordination is miss-
ing. As Kivelä addresses in his dissertation, there are also non-functioning issues and the silo-
effect is visible65. For example, the Regional State Administrative Agencies were intended to 
be the coordinating entity of preparedness planning on a regional level, but as the regulatory 
base was constructed in 2012 it lacked the jurisdictional power to do so. 
However, while planning is not sufficient also joint exercises and close-call situation investi-
gations could be arranged to learn from past errors or difficulties. Kivelä argues that shared 
exercises should be arranged to improve coordination in interagency cooperation situations on 
five levels: regulatory, shared exercises, organizational level, situational leadership and mind 
set66. He claims that: 
The current lack of coordination impedes significantly the coordination of ex-
ceptional situations.67 
Juhani Kivelä 
Even though the quotation above is alarming, Kivelä also states that despite the lack of coor-
dination, the overall trust and control over exceptional situations between 2012-201468 suc-
                                                 
61 Interview with the NBI representative.  
62 Kivelä 2016.  
63 Kivelä 2016, 191. 
64 Ministry of Defence 2010.  
65 Kivelä 2016, 187, 192. 
66 Kivelä 2016, 194. 
67 Kivelä 2016, 195. 
68 Kivelä’s dissertation focuses the preparedness in Finland between 2012 and 2014, hence the timeline.  
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ceeded satisfactorily. He states that the Finnish authorities are innovative, which could be 
claimed as a factor of national strength. Yet, he continues it might also be a weakness or a 
threat if it prevents the Finnish policy-makers from acknowledging the underlying issues.69 As 
to learning from the past, Kivelä discloses that multiagency cooperation has been performed 
many times, including at the school shootings in Jokela70 and Kauhajoki71, but the same issues 
with coordination is present. He claims that the biggest issues are with situation command72.  
Even though Kivelä presented that lessons had not been learned from the two school shoot-
ings, the Finnish authorities still do preparedness-related interagency cooperation by arrang-
ing shared exercises locally. They are especially regular in areas with critical or high-risk 
places, such as harbors and airports. The common exercises provide a possibility for the au-
thorities to get to know one another (personal relations) and also to familiarize themselves 
with the different backgrounds and organizational cultures. It also provides a possibility for 
the authorities to see and learn the jurisdiction of another authority, and meet the people with 
whom cooperation will be made in a real situation. The additional value in this is that know-
ing people makes cooperation easier, as it establishes trust73. 
Leadership is realized in the process whereby one or more individuals succeeds 
in attempting to frame and define the reality of others. Indeed, leadership situa-
tions may be conceived as those in which there exists an obligation or a per-
ceived right on the part of certain individuals to define the reality of others.74 
Linda Smircich & Gareth Morgan 
Smircich’s and Morgan’s suggestion that the leader is picked amongst the peers does not 
comply with an interagency cooperation situation. Specifically, the overall situation com-
mand responsibility goes to the authority under whose jurisdiction the case belongs to. I.e. in 
a rescue situation the situation command is with the Fire and Rescue Department, where as 
the Police is responsible in a criminal or public order and security. 
The previously mentioned situation leadership combined with interagency cooperation are 
problematic. Indeed, Kivelä questioned the authorities’ ability to coordinate exceptional situa-
                                                 
69 Kivelä 2016, 195.  
70 Investigation Commission of the Jokela School shooting.  
71 Investigation Commission of the Kauhajoki School shooting.  
72 Kivelä 2016, 138-142. 
73 Interview with the Finnish Border Guard representatives; Interview with the NBI representative; Interview 
with the Customs representatives.  
74 258. 
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tions in a multiagency cooperation situation. Also, a study has been conducted in the Ministry 
of the Interior, called Yleisjohtajuutta moniviranomaistilanteissa selvittäneen työryhmän lop-
puraportti75 or A report on overall situation command in a multiagency cooperation situation, 
as translated freely. The report displays similar difficulties as what were addressed by Kivelä. 
It appears that different authorities may have a differing perception on the shared situation, its 
management and the other authority’s jurisdiction76, which might lead to positive discrepancy 
if there are two or more entities claiming the overall situation command. In contrast, a nega-
tive discrepancy is formed if no authority claims the overall situation command. If the legisla-
tion does not provide a clear jurisdiction to any one authority, it can be agreed upon in be-
tween the participating entities.77 Nonetheless, the study provides a disclaimer that the Rescue 
act provides power for the officer in charge of the rescue operations to make an explicit deci-
sion on starting or ending the rescue operation. To clarify, this means that the overall situation 
command is to be transferred to the authority, under whose jurisdiction the operation then 
falls, e.g. the police in a criminal investigation. 
According to Kivelä, a shared multi-agency training would help especially with the problems 
with the coordination or situational management in an exceptional situation.78 However, not 
all authorities seemed to be interested in shared training79. Yet, as he states, the problems and 
issues with coordination and overall situation command arise as both the Fire and Rescue De-
partment and the Police got on-scene in the Kauhajoki and Jokela school shootings. Notewor-
thy is that the school shootings were very similar incidents, but it appears that despite the time 
in between the shootings (There was one (1) year in between the incidents), the lessons were 
not learned and the same errors were repeated80. The Investigation Commission’s reports on 
Kauhajoki and Jokela School shootings did not discuss whether the participants had had a 
debriefing discussion and discussed about what was done and what could be learned from it 
(Lessons Learned). Therefore, it can only be speculated that if such a method were used, it 
might have enabled learning from the past and to improve cooperation for the next case. For 
example, if Paukkunen’s model was applied and the situations discussed afterwards, there is a 
possibility that the authorities could have understood the operational difficulties faced on-
scene by other authorities. 
 
                                                 
75 Sisäministeriö 2015.  
76 Sisäministeriö 2015, 4. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Kivelä 2016, 190.  
79 Ibid. 191. 
80 Kivelä 2016, 138. 
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2.6 Leadership and interagency cooperation 
In the first five (5) subchapters I built this thesis’ theoretical framework. In this final subchap-
ter will built the combined framework of leadership and interagency cooperation. As stated 
earlier, it is not clear as to how the situation leadership in a multiagency cooperation situation 
works or should work. However, by combining the fourfold typology of leadership with Val-
tonen’s research, I will propose a model on how it could be approached.  
As Aalto proposed, the fourfold typology can be divided into two components: one that can 
be affected on-scene by the leader (leadership and management) and the other that creates the 
context in which the leadership takes place (organizational culture and organizational struc-
ture). In order to be able to perform as a leader in any context or the operating environment, 
including in a cooperation situation, a set of skills and tools are required. Valtonen named 
them the Driving Forces81, or the fundamentals, of cooperation: the fundamentals of the oper-
ating environment and the characteristics in cooperation. Valtonen also concluded that in ad-
dition to the fundamentals of cooperation, there are Weak Signals which affect cooperation 
but are either in hiding or not talked about.82 Table 1 lists Valtonen’s fundamentals and weak 
signals. They are elaborated under the table by directly translating them83 from Valtonen’s 
research. It should be noted that even though they are represented in the same table, they have 
no correlation or correspondence between each other. 
 
 
Table 1: Valtonen's Driving Forces and Weak Signals 
                                                 
81 Valtonen 2010, 241. 
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Table 1 presents Valtonen’s Driving Forces for cooperation, which are listed under Funda-
mental Characteristics of Cooperation and Fundamentals of the Operating Environment. The 
third column presents the Weak Signals. These aspects affecting cooperation were the results 
of Valtonen’s Delphi method analysis. They have been verified with the participants as being 
the key elements in making cooperation work. The weak signals may affect cooperation di-
rectly, or might be overridden during cooperation. These fundamentals are very much appli-
cable to this thesis since they are collected from the experiences of the authorities, and I will 
study the perceptions on interagency cooperation in the Thor Liberty case.  
 
Fundamental Characteristics of Cooperation84 
Trust is a key element in cooperation, and it was emphasized in the security authority con-
text. Trust means mutual respect for one another in the cooperation situations, as well as be-
fore it.  
Professionalism / Teamwork Competence is a complex characteristics. On the one hand it 
expects knowledge and adaptive ability, which brings added value to cooperation, especially 
from information sharing and confidentiality perspectives. On the other hand efficiency is 
expected. 
Willingness to cooperate is about attitude and activity. Other authorities are expected to be 
cooperation-oriented at the operational level. 
Commitment combines trust and professionalism. In practice commitment means availability 
and willingness to cooperate in shared situations.  
 
Fundamentals of the Operating Environment85 
The Finnish Interagency Cooperation works. The authorities’ are trusted to be objective 
and professional, and to follow the rule of law.  
                                                                                                                                                        
82 Valtonen 2010, 241 – 244. 
83 The translations are made by the author with no professional linguistics background.  
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Successful cooperation on all operational levels means that cross-administrative and cross-
sectoral cooperation works.  
International cooperation works, i.e. Finland has established its role in an international con-
text, especially with the neighboring countries.  
Synergy from limited resources refers to two things. Firstly, Finland is a small country with 
limited resources, so cooperation enables authorities to gain benefit from other authorities’ 
equipment, know-how and resources if needed. Secondly, the shared cultural background, 
personal relationships and comprehensive security thinking furthers cooperation.  
Safety and security overpower disputes means that despite there might be personal, sectoral 
or silo issues, security always comes first. No case will be left unmanaged even if there is 
competition present. 
 
Weak Signals86 
Power refers to jurisdiction and overall command of the situation. If power is used right it 
will become the coordinative and clarifying element. In turn, if it is misused it will lead to 
adverse outcome in terms of cooperation.  
Personification means that if the persons subsist well, cooperation is easy. However, if there 
is personal conflicts cooperation may become difficult. Another aspect is that many times 
persons of contact for cooperation remain constant, which makes forwarding know-how and 
tacit knowledge ineffectual.  
Hidden agendas refer to underlying issues that might occur behind the “official” interagency 
cooperation. They are usually based on self-interest, and are believed to lead to the ending of 
cooperation if they are revealed.  
Working together is enough relates to the entities only working together rather than aiming 
to improve cooperation. The abovementioned fundamentals are not fundamental to everyone. 
                                                                                                                                                        
84 Valtonen 2010, 423. 
85 Valtonen 2010, 422. 
86 Valtonen 2010, 424. 
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Rhetorical cooperation means that everything looks good on paper but in practice what is 
spoken and what is done do not meet. This is not conventional at the operational-tactical level.  
Valtonen also presented areas that should be developed regarding interagency cooperation. 
However, they are not included into this thesis. This limitation has been made as the thesis 
will not focus on improving cooperation, but rather collect insights on how it works.  
Since interagency cooperation cannot be lead in the same way as contemporary teams, it has 
to be addressed from another approach. By combining Aalto’s suggestion with Valtonen’s 
fundamentals, cooperation can be addressed in conjunction with leadership in a situation, or 
as the interviewees stated, in situation coordination. Figure 2 clarifies how the fourfold typol-
ogy, the fundamentals of cooperation, and the weak signals positions with one another so that 
situation coordination can be analyzed. 
 
 
Figure 2: Situation coordination 
 
Figure 2 above illustrates one model for analyzing how well coordination works in a multia-
gency cooperation situation. In this thesis, Valtonen’s fundamentals listed above will be com-
pared with the studied case, and the results can, in theory, be placed under the relevant fun-
damental division. This way it is possible to see whether the coordination and the overall 
command was balanced, as suggested by Huhtinen.  
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The fundamental characteristics are carried out through the study as the phenomenographical 
analysis on the data is conducted. They will affect the sub-categories, as the theoretical 
framework will guide the approach in the analysis. In chapter five (5) the results will be dis-
cussed with Valtonen’s fundamentals.  
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3 THEORETICAL PREMISES 
Ilkka Niiniluoto87 discusses why research and science are necessary. According to him, all 
research needs to be well justified, and preferably should be better defined than to merely 
pursue the overall and general interest.88 Then again, Antti Eskola89 discusses that social insti-
tutions such as the Police or any other authority as an organization, strives to fulfill their as-
signed duties, whereas the researchers and research institutions strive to provide resources for 
the society. These studies should participate in maintaining societal functions and objec-
tives90. This thesis is a case study research relying on qualitative research methods and aims 
to provide insights on how interagency cooperation works. The case study research focuses on 
the subjective perceptions on how interagency cooperation worked in the Thor Liberty case. 
The thesis is constructed on individual thematic interviews, which are analyzed with phenom-
enography. This research is based on a need to understand interagency cooperation, which 
will be done by comparing the different perceptions so that we can understand the possible 
difficulties and confrontations between the participating agencies. This is important if the 
agencies want to improve the cooperation, which is needed to be able to function in complex 
situations.  
The research is positioned in the philosophical field of empiricisms. Empiricism is a logical 
choice since its approach presumes that knowledge is based on experiences and senses91. It 
argues that knowledge builds upon the previous knowledge and experiences. This thesis fo-
cuses on the subjective understanding and experiences of the represented authorities that were 
involved with the operational action at the Thor Liberty Case. All of the interviewed repre-
sentatives acted as the person-in-charge in their organization, and attended the overall duty 
command’s management board92. Therefore the approach is the same in this case study as 
empiricism is. 
While empiricism presumes knowledge is gained through experiences, Hans-Georg Gada-
mer’s hermeneutic approach social sciences require human factors such as memory and life 
experience93. He presents the hermeneutic approach on knowledge, meaning that knowledge 
is processed by portraying issues and their contexts, and the phenomenon is regarded with 
                                                 
87 Niiniluoto 1980. 
88 Ibid. 60. 
89 Eskola 1967. 
90 Eskola 1967, 318. 
91 Niiniluoto 1980.; Hirsjärvi, Remes & Sajavaara. 1997; Määttänen 1995; Mason 2002. 
92 According to the Rescue Act § 35 2, The officer in overall charge of the situation may appoint a management 
group with representatives of the authorities, agencies and voluntary units taking part in the operations as its 
members and invite experts to provide assistance. 
93 Gadamer 2004, 6. 
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other simultaneous ones and their development.94 Here, the case study research defines the 
Thor Liberty’s case as the context and interagency cooperation as the issue. Consequently, 
the experiences that the attendees had received previously were used to perform all necessary 
tasks in this case while interacting with the surroundings and other authorities. 
The gained experience was also a factor in Vesa Valtonen’s dissertation. Valtonen states that 
security authorities cooperate with a primary objective to prevent or lessen suffering, or to 
help recovering from it.95 This applies partly also to my thesis, as the initial incident which 
lead to the case was to prevent a large-scale emergency from happening due to the discovered 
explosives. Then again, the second part of the incident was to investigate what laws had been 
broken, why, and whether a legal punishment should be imposed on those responsible. Still, I 
agree with Valtonen’s conclusion that the phenomenon can be studied from Gadamer’s view-
point that the issue is bigger than the sum of its parts, or that experience takes time to accumu-
late96.  
In order to study interagency cooperation, which is a vast and complex phenomenon, case 
study research was used as the research strategy. Case study research can be seen as a study 
on one incident in a phenomenon, or a set of incidents in a phenomenon97. Case study re-
search investigates issues in the real world rather than in artificially created settings98. Ac-
cording to Yin99 case study research is a widely used strategy in the Social Sciences and Pub-
lic Administration100, under which this thesis also falls. It is used often when the researcher 
has little or no control over the research situation101. This is true in this study, as the studied 
case happened in 2011 – 2012, and the researcher was not there. Therefore, as the case pre-
sented in chapter 4.1 is built upon the interviews, the media releases and news, the researcher 
will only handle the data as it is, and cannot affect the situation. At the same time the data will 
be analyzed to discover the different perceptions of interagency cooperation. 
A case study can be applied to research where the research question is a how or a why –
question. As the research question in this study is How interagency cooperation worked in the 
Thor Liberty case?, case study as a research strategy is reasoned102. It could be argued that 
also other research methods or strategies could answer the how and why questions instead of a 
                                                 
94 Koppa. 
95 26. 
96 Gadamer 2004, 7. 
97 Gomm; Hammersley & Foster. 2000, 4 – 5. 
98 Ibid. 5 – 6. 
99 Yin 1994, xiii. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 1. 
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case study, but given that the research data is collected from the involved participants who 
were on the scene and in the situation command role in their organization, it limits the possi-
bilities. No quantifiable data is needed but the key person’s subjective views. This is support-
ed by the case study research strategy.  
The research methods used in this thesis are qualitative. Qualitative research enables to study 
the social world in many dimensions, including everyday life and its perception and experi-
ences. The experiences are the essence that help us to understand how things work in a partic-
ular context and what their significance is. Qualitative research is often claimed to be anecdo-
tal or illustrative103 whereas quantitative research aims to find correlations and statistic regu-
larities104. As the aim is to illustrate the different perceptions on interagency cooperation, 
qualitative research methods for collecting and analyzing research data are a logical choice. 
Qualitative or quantitative research may both be criticized by their shortcomings but in order 
to do so the logic behind the chosen methodology should first be understood.105 Some of the 
methodologies may be used in both qualitative and quantitative research106, which illustrates 
the fine line between the two approaches. Although this research is a qualitative-one, it is 
mainly so because of the case study approach. Should the focus be on, for example, how the 
authorities’ see something in general without it being tied to a specific case, then it could be 
studied quantitatively focusing on the number of the answers rather than the content of the 
interviews. In this study the content and quality of the interviews is more important than their 
quantity. The research method used for collecting data is individual thematic interviews, and 
the data is analyzed with phenomenography.  
Interviews as a data collection method is very common in qualitative research107, especially if 
the researched phenomenon is relatively unknown. According to Hirsjärvi, Remes and Saja-
vaara (1997) interviews are also a good choice if the interviewees are likely to expand the 
previous knowledge and understanding on the studied issues, and also explain the issue in a 
wider context than what the researcher can predict108. As the preliminary understanding on the 
Thor Liberty case was built upon the media releases, all of the aforementioned points were 
true. A thematic interview, also known as a focused interview, means that the interview is 
                                                                                                                                                        
102 Yin 1994, 5 – 6. 
103 Mason 2002, 1, 4. 
104 Hirsjärvi et. al. 1997, 198. 
105 Mason 2002, 1, 4. 
106 ibid. 4. 
107 Hirsjärvi et. al. 1997, 192.  
108 Hirsjärvi et. al. 1997, 192; Mason 2002.; Routio 2007. 
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constructed of themes.109 According to Hirsjärvi et al. the themes are often known, but the 
final form and order of the questions are not set110, and was vaguely also the case with these 
interviews. Indeed, the questions were already set, but how they were asked an in which order 
varied. This was due to the fact that the interviewees were let to talk freely, and the questions 
were used to guide the discussion back to the topic, and to keeping the focus on the case. 
Phenomenography was chosen as the methodology of my thesis as the core scope is to under-
stand the different perceptions on how the authorities viewed and experienced interagency 
cooperation. A phenomenographical perception is based on fundamental understanding of a 
phenomenon111. According to Michael Uljens112, a person forms a perception of a phenome-
non by using the earlier experiences and thoughts regarding it. Thereupon that perception 
means the ratio or relationship between the individual and the context or environment113. The 
perception, however, can be influenced after additional experience and pondering, and they 
can be categorized with the phenomenographic method. The categories are usually equal with 
one another rather than hierarchical, and thus allows the perceptions to be compared with each 
other.114 As Marton states, phenomenographers: 
Do not try to describe things as they are, nor do we discuss whether or not things can 
be described ‘as they are’; rather, we try to characterize how things appear to peo-
ple.115 
Ference Marton 
According to Marton, interviewing is the primary method of phenomenographic data collec-
tion116. He emphasizes that the questions, and the method how they are asked, are important 
when using the phenomenographical method. He advises to use open-ended questions so that 
the interviewee may choose how to answer and what to include to it (the dimension). The di-
mensions reveal then how the interviewee perceives the world117. In this thesis I used thematic 
interviews where the interviewee is asked questions related to specific topic118. Rather than 
having a sequences set of questions the structure was more flexible, and the situation was kept 
                                                 
109 Vilkka 2005, 182. 
110 1997, 195. 
111 Uljens 1992. 
112 Uljens 1992, 86, 95–101. 
113 See also Häkkinen 1996. 
114 Uljens 1992, 86, 95–101. 
115 Marton, 45. 
116 Marton 1981, 153. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Mason 2002, 62–63. 
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unofficial. To ensure the interviewees had the possibility to choose how to answer, they were 
let to speak even though it was not always related to the question and the topic.  
Phenomenography seems to support the case study research strategy well. According to Niik-
ko119 the empirical research can be conducted with a set group. As this case study focuses on 
what happened as the Thor Liberty was stopped at the Mussalo harbor, and its related inter-
agency cooperation with set authorities and individuals, the case offers a good and logical 
framework. However, phenomenography has been criticized on that the results are very con-
text-dependent120. That is true, but again, as the scope of this thesis is to understand the inter-
agency cooperation with the set case, in my opinion this critique is invalidated.  
According to Ference Marton121, people with different cultural backgrounds should not be 
compared when the studied phenomenon is of the same reality. These people view the world 
differently, not just interpret it. As to phenomenography, it is about studying the same reality 
by comparing its different conceptions. This is evident with my interviewees, as they all are 
experienced authorities in their own fields, attending to the same case. Yet the conceptions 
differ from one another due to the organizations they represent, with their working histories, 
as well as with their education. 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
The data was collected with eight (8) thematic interviews and one complementary set of writ-
ten questions and answers. All interviews were arranged individually with the exception that 
there were two people from the same organization present with the Finnish Customs and the 
Finnish Border Guard interviews. The themes that the interview questions concerned were 
leadership and coordination, communication and preparedness as well as trust. The question-
naire is attached to this thesis and can be found in Appendix 1. 
My initial goal was to interview all parties involved in the case, but I later narrowed it down 
to the authorities that were operational on the scene at the Port of HaminaKotka. The inter-
viewed people were from the Finnish Border Guard, The Finnish Customs, Kotka Police de-
partment from the public order and safety section, Kotka Police Department’s Chief Inspec-
tor, the National Bureau of Investigations, a representative from the harbor, The Fire and Res-
                                                 
119 Niikko 2003, 7, 43. 
120 Huusko & Paloniemi 2006, 166. 
121 Marton 1981, 179–180. 
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cue Department and the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi). Also, a request for inter-
view was sent to the Finnish Defence Forces, but no interview was granted. The interviewees 
were chosen according to their participation in the incident. If any agency would have sug-
gested some other person than the situational command for the interview it would have been 
rejected so that the interviewees’ role and position in all agencies remained equivalent.  
Six interviews were arranged face to face, out of which four were arranged at the interview-
ees’ premises. One interview was arranged at Santahamina in the National Defence Universi-
ty’s facilities, and one was arranged at the Ministry of Defence premises. One interview was 
conducted by using Microsoft Lync, a Skype-type web-based programme. The final interview 
was held as a teleconference by using a cell phone. Each of the interviews were recorded. A 
consent for the recording was asked verbally from each interviewee prior to starting the re-
cording. As the Finnish Customs interview was ended before there was time to go through all 
the interview questions, a questionnaire was sent to the two Customs representatives via 
email. This creates an anomaly to the data, as the respondent had time to think and review 
their answers and might not be as spontaneous as with a live interview either face to face or 
by electronic means. This is further discussed in section 6.1, Critique. Still, in terms of the 
content the answers supplemented the interrupted interview well.  
According to Syrjälä, Ahonen, Syrjäläinen and Saari122 the interview has to be an interactive 
situation, where the discussion should flow freely. Every interview had the interactive ele-
ment, and supplementary or additional and clarifying questions regarding the interview 
themes were made when necessary. As stated before, the interviewees were allowed to talk 
freely even though the discussion was not focused on the topic, but it was redirected if it did 
not return on its own. This was partly due to the time that had passed between the case and the 
interviews. Some interviewees used their notes from the case to refresh their memory, where 
as some simply stated they would rely on their memory.  
Media was actively reporting the case from the first press conference until weeks after the 
ship left Finland, and even after that but less frequently. The last news was released in De-
cember 2015, as the preliminary criminal investigation was ended in Finland123. To comple-
ment the case, a light media collection was done on the case, but it was not analyzed. The data 
was used to build the case study, which is present in chapter 4.1. It illustrated how vast the 
media attention was directed towards the case.  
                                                 
122 Syrjälä, Ahonen, Syrjäläinen, & Saari 1994.  
123 E.g. Lessheikki 2015.  
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The media collection had news releases from 28 different online media houses. There were 66 
releases with slightly different content. Out of these eight (8) were from outside of Finland, 
and the rest, 20, were Finnish media houses. The media and press releases often aim to create 
interesting headlines, and the industry in under constant time pressure124. Therefore, the data 
is not always verified, creating a reliability issue with the media. Because of this the media 
was not used as a primary source. Still, the media data set could have been analyzed separate-
ly, but as it does not support or give any added value in this thesis to the opinions and percep-
tions of the interviewees it was left aside.  
 
3.2 Data Analysis 
All of the interviews were recorded and later transcribed. At this point they were anonymized 
by removing all features that could be identifiable to the interviewee. All parts of the inter-
views that were not relevant to the study were removed, like when a phone rang and the inter-
viewee answered it, and other similar incidents. If the interviewee did not finish the sentence 
and instead jumped to another issue, it was marked with three dots (…). All together it added 
up to approximately 8,5 hours of recorded interviews and 61 pages on written text. The differ-
ent transcribed interviews were combined into one document and mixed in as logical order as 
possible. A timeline of how the operation proceeded was formed. Then, the rest of the data 
was categorized according to the interview questions so that following each questions was the 
related answers of all interviews. After the combination the whole data was read through care-
fully to get a good overview on the answers.  
The data can be seen as having in two sections: What happened in the Thor Liberty case, and 
how the interviewees perceived the interagency cooperation. The two sections are partly over-
lapping. This is relevant since the first section was also used to get a clear picture on what 
happened at the case, and the interviewees mainly kept with facts. This section can be com-
pared with Marton’s125 first-order, which is a statement about reality126. The second section 
collects the subjective experiences on the case, and thus can be equated with the second-order, 
which is seen as a statement about people’s conception of reality127. 
                                                 
124 Julkisen sanan neuvosto.; Stearns & Kille 2015. 
125 Marton 1981. 
126 Ibid. 177 – 178, 182. 
127 Marton 1981, 177-178, 182. 
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4 THOR LIBERTY AND INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
This chapter presents the results of the phenomenographical analysis. As is the purpose of 
phenomenography, the authorities had different perceptions of how interagency cooperation 
worked with the Thor Liberty case. It should be noted that the perception presented in this 
chapter are the subjective perceptions of the interviewees. However, in order to ensure the 
anonymity of the interviewees they will be referred to by their agency. Nonetheless, the per-
ceptions do not present the agency’s official stance on interagency cooperation. 
As stated before, the Finnish Defence Forces was not interviewed for this thesis, which has to 
be acknowledged. It is relevant because in addition to that they were involved in the case, 
they were also referred to in the interviews, and they are also referred to in this thesis. Thus, it 
should be noted that all references to the Finnish Defence Forces and their actions are second-
hand information, meaning that their subjective perception on what happened is not covered. 
Simultaneously their role in this situation was relevant and for that reason will be included 
into this thesis.  
After reviewing the data many times it was evident that there was a clear difference in percep-
tions between the two situational organizations. In other words the perception on the case was 
influenced and dependent on which operation the entity was involved with. The operation of 
preventing a large-scale emergency (hereinafter the rescue operation) involved the Fire and 
Rescue Department, the local Police, the Finnish Border Guard, and Trafi. In turn, the prelim-
inary investigation operation (hereinafter the criminal case) involved the local Police’s Chief 
Inspector, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Finnish Customs. The Finnish De-
fence Forces provided executive assistance to both operations, and the Port’s representative 
was involved in the whole Thor Liberty case. This division is essential as the categorization 
enables the comparison of the different perceptions also on this level.  
This chapter has two section. Subchapter 4.1 presents the case study as it happened according 
to the interviews. The narration is supported by media. It also includes a brief description on 
the authorities that were present in the operations. Because of the many steps of the incident, 
a timeline has been constructed, and is found in Appendix 2. Chapter 4.2 focuses on the re-
sults from the phenomenographical analysis and is divided into the categorization formed 
during the analysis. Chapter 4.2.4 presents the phenomenographical outcome spaces. The 
framework constructed in chapter 2.6 for analyzing situation coordination will be used in 
chapter 5.  
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4.1 Thor Liberty 
On December 13th 2011 a cargo ship called Thor Liberty was sailing to Finland, and contacted 
the Finnish Port of HaminaKotka for a pilot128. The ship sailed under United Kingdom’s flag, 
and is registered in the Isle of Man129, but is operated by a Danish company called Thorco 
Shipping A/S130. As the ship docked in port on December 15th, the stevedores started to stow 
the anchor chain into the hold as was the original intention for the ship coming to Finland. 
Stowing the chain created sparks when metal hit metal131. The stevedores then noticed some 
regular cardboard packages that were dislodged132 and tilted against the hold wall, and some 
packages were broken with the insides spread around the floor133. The boxes had labels indi-
cating they contained explosives, as is visible on Figure 3. There were no ceiling or bulkheads 
to separate the sections. The boxes appeared to be damaged and as it was discovered that 
some of the explosives had leaked out the work was interrupted, and the authorities were 
called to inspect the damage.134 The tilted piles of boxes are visible in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128 Yle Kymenlaakso (a); Interview with the Finnish Customs representatives; Interview with the Trafi repre-
sentative. 
129 Taylor 2011; Yle Kymenlaakso (b). 
130 Mikkelsen 2011. 
131 Interview with the Customs representatives; Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with the 
Trafi representative. 
132 Yle Kymenlaakso (a). 
133 Interview with the Finnish Customs representatives; Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with 
the Trafi representative. 
134 Interview with the Trafi representative; Interview with the F&R D representative. 
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Figure 3: Explosives-label visible on the left135 
 
The HaminaKotka port operator and the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi) were con-
tacted first136. Trafi conducted a Port State Control137 on the ship, which was suitable for 
transporting such cargo but the method of stowage was wrong138. The explosives should have 
been stowed into closed transport units, not on cargo pallets. Next, Trafi called in the Fire and 
Rescue Department (F&R D)139 to assist in assessing the situation in the ship140. The ship was 
officially detained141. As the state of the cardboard boxes and the fact that they contained ex-
plosives were discovered, a large rescue operation to prevent a large-scale accident began. 
Approximately 159 tons of explosives were found in the hold.142 The F&R D also contacted 
                                                 
135 The picture was received from the Finnish Transport Safety Agency. 
136 Interview with the port representative; Interview with the Trafi representative. 
137 Trafi 2011; Laki alusturvallisuuden valvonnasta 370/1995, § 5 and § 9; Laki eräiden irtolastialusten turvalli-
sesta lastaamisesta ja lastin purkamisesta 1206/2004, § 15. 
138 Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with the Trafi representative. 
139 Pelastuslaki 379/2011, § 32, § 42. 
140 Ibid; interview with the port representative. 
141  Laki eräiden irtolastialusten turvallisesta lastaamisesta ja lastin purkamisesta1206/2004, § 15; Laki 
alusturvallisuuden valvonnasta 370/1995, § 5 & § 12. 
142 Interview with the F&R D representative; Yle Kymenlaakso (c).  
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the local police in Kotka143, the Finnish Border Guard’s Gulf of Finland Coast Guard Dis-
trict144. They agreed that a Patrol vessel was to be sent to the harbor145. Furthermore, the Safe-
ty Investigation Authority (SIA) was contacted due to the significant amount of explosives, 
and the potential for a massive accident146. 
The operation started with a joint meeting on December 19th 2011, where the Fire and Rescue 
Department assumed the overall situation command147. In addition to the Fire and Rescue 
Department and Trafi, also the Finnish Border Guards (BG), local Police, The Finnish De-
fence Forces (DF), SIA, and the local hospital district (HD)148 participated due to the raised 
preparedness in the area. All of the other authorities also had a person-in-charge, who worked 
closely together with the overall situation commander, forming a management board149. In 
other words, as the rescue operation was going on, the overall situation commander had a 
panel of experts aiding him in the situation.  
The first press conference was arranged on Monday the 19th in December, and all the previ-
ously mentioned authorities were present. At first Trafi was appointed as the responsible au-
thority for the situation, but as the overall situation command was assumed by the F&R D, the 
responsibility also passed to it150. It was later agreed that every authority was responsible for 
their own communications with the media.  
In addition to the rescue operation, the local Police’s Chief Inspector started a preliminary 
investigation on whether there was a reason to suspect a crime151, which was a different oper-
ation than what the F&R D was leading. The two parallel operations are illustrated in Table2. 
To verify that the explosive was the substance it was claimed to be, the Police explosives 
                                                 
143 Poliisilaki 872/2011.; Interview with the Fire and Rescue Department representative; Interview with the local 
Police.  
144 Rajavartiolaki 578/2005 §3 1; Interview with the Border Guard representatives; Interview with the F&R D 
representative. 
145 Interview with the Finnish Border Guard representatives; Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview 
with the Finnish Customs representatives; Interview with the National Bureau of Investigation representative. 
146 Turvallisuustutkintalaki 525/2011 § 8 and § 2 4. 
147 Pelastuslaki 379/2011, § 35 1. 
148 Even though the Hospital District and the Safety Investigation Agency are mentioned here, they are not in-
cluded into the study. The motivation for mentioning them is to show the variety of entities involved. 
149 Pelastuslaki 379/2011, § 35 1. 
150 Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with the Trafi representative; Interview with the Border 
Guard representatives.  
151 Interview with the local Police representative; Interview with the Finnish Customs representatives; Interview 
with the Border Guard representatives; Interview with the NBI representative. 
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team as well as the Finnish Defence Forces were called in to assist152. The analysis done by 
the Finnish Defence Forces that the explosive was nitroguanidine153. 
A decision was made that the cargo has to be re-stowed into ship containers154. The team of 
experts from the Police, the Defence Forces, Trafi and the Fire and Rescue Department calcu-
lated and cordoned a safe area, which reached to 1,000 meters in every direction155. The local 
Police cordoned the area from land, whereas the Finnish Border Guard cordoned the area 
from the sea156. Before the re-stowing began in the hold, a further inspection was done on 
other cargo and the ship’s cargo manifests.  
 
 
Figure 4: Some boxes had fallen157 
                                                 
152 Laki puolustusvoimista 551/2007, § 2 2. 
153 According to the F&R D representative, nitroguanidine is an explosive that can be compared to gun powder 
by its explosives qualities. It requires high temperatures and extensive friction or hit for a reaction. According to 
Yle Uutiset (a) the cargo’s destructive force was massive, yet the risk for it to explode was small.  
154 Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with the Trafi representative.  
155 ibid; Joki 2011.  
156 Interview with the local Police representative; Interview with the Customs representatives; Interview with the 
Border Guard representatives; Interview with the F&R D representative. 
157 The picture was received from the Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi. 
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In addition to the explosives, the sea cargo manifest also listed other items. The manifest stat-
ed “rockets”, which was interpreted as fireworks by the harbor in Germany158, and located in 
the containers amongst the explosives’ boxes. In order to be able to open and re-seal the 
sealed containers to check the goods159, the Finnish Customs inspection group was asked to 
open the containers160. The containers revealed the declared rockets to be 69 missiles which 
were identified by the Finnish Defence Forces to be Patriot air defence missiles. While the 
Fire and Rescue Department contacted the Ministry of the Interior, the local Customs contact-
ed the Ministry of Defence to check whether an export and transit permit had been issued for 
the missiles161. The initial notification was received already on December 20th in the early 
afternoon, declaring the lack of the permission. The Finnish Customs Economic Crime Inves-
tigation Unit became involved with the case, and also kept the Prime Minister’s Office’s Situ-
ation Centre informed on the criminal investigation process162.  
In regards to the criminal investigation, the attending authorities were the Finnish Customs, 
and the Police Chief Inspector. After discovering the missiles, cooperation on the criminal 
investigation continued, while the prevention of a large-scale accident operation was still on-
going. This meant that there were two situations and two situation management structures163. 
The two separate situations are illustrated in Table 2.  
On Wednesday December 21st the National Bureau of Investigation took over the Police in-
vestigation164. As stated by the interviewee from the National Bureau of Investigation, even 
though he was assigned as the situation commander for the criminal investigation the alloca-
tion of duties and responsibilities was done by the head of the Customs operation in coopera-
tion with him165. The arrangement on the jurisdiction was agreed on the administrative level, 
while the duties and responsibilities were agreed locally. This was due to the Customs having 
the best knowledge of the situation and the offences. Both authorities have the same jurisdic-
                                                 
158 Interview with the Chief Inspector; Interview with the F&R D representative; Yle Uutiset (b); Yle; Helsingin 
Sanomat.  
159 Goods is a general Customs term, used for all goods moved in international trade. 
160 Tullilaki 1466/1994 § 14. 
161 Laki puolustustarvikkeiden maastaviennistä ja kauttakuljetuksesta 242/1990 § 1. 
162 Interview with the Finnish Customs representatives. Even though the Situation Centre was involved, it is not 
included into this study, as their role was to keep the relevant government officials aware of the incident’s devel-
opment.  
163 Interview with the Border Guard representatives; Interview with the NBI representative; Interview with the 
local Police representative; Interview with the Chief Inspector.  
164 Laki poliisin hallinnosta 110/1992 § 9. 
165 Interview with the NBI representative; interview with the Finnish Customs representatives. 
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tion in terms of pre-trial investigation166 and coercive measures167. The Finnish Security Intel-
ligence Service also conducted their own tasks168. 
 
15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Prevention of the large-scale 
emergency -operation
Criminal  Investigation
December 2011 January 2012
 
Table 2: The two simultaneous operations 
 
During further inspection of the manifest and transport documentation, the Customs along 
with the other investigative parties169 contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inquire if 
the cargo had an export license. The explosive, nitroguanidine, is a dual-use substance and 
requires an export permit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs170. The Finnish Customs seized 
the missiles, and the explosives171 were detained under customs control on Wednesday De-
cember 21st. The Patriot missiles were eventually transferred to a secure location172 in cooper-
ation with the Finnish Defence Forces and the Police. The Customs and the Police detained 
the captain and the first officer of the vessel, but were almost immediately advised by Trafi 
that they were not to be removed from the ship173. Thus, the questioning was done onboard. 
An overall inspection of the vessel was also conducted.  
The re-stowage of the explosives began during Christmas holidays when the harbor quieted 
down174. The airspace was also closed for that time by Trafi175. In order to prevent curious 
citizens and the media from endangering themselves the area was also cordoned off by the 
Police and the Border Guard176. The stowing lasted until December 26th, after which Trafi 
released the ship. However, the criminal investigation was still ongoing after the release by 
                                                 
166 Esitutkintalaki 805/2011 §1 2. 
167 Pakkokeinolaki 806/2011 § 2; Tullilaki § 43.; Maritime Executive 2011. 
168 The FSIS’s line of investigation is not included into this study; Yle Kymenlaakso (d); Email from the FSIS.; 
Aamulehti 2011. 
169 The other parties were the Finnish Defence Forces and the Police. 
170 Laki kaksikäyttötuotteiden vientivalvonnasta 562/1996, § 2. 
171 Laki puolustustarvikkeiden maastaviennistä ja kauttakuljetuksesta 242/1990 § 1.; Finnish Customs 2012. 
172 Interview with the Chief Inspector; Interview with the NBI representative; Interview with the Finnish Cus-
toms representatives; Yle 2011; Taylor 2011. 
173 Interview with the Trafi representative; Interview with the NBI representative; Interview with the local Police 
representative. 
174 Joki 2011.  
175 Ilmailulaki 1194/2009 § 8. 
176 Interview with the NBI representative.  
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Trafi, and the ship stayed in Kotka. The transit and export permit for the missiles were issued 
on December 29th and 30th, after which the seize was reversed and the missiles loaded back on 
the ship on January 3rd 2012. As to the explosives, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs found that 
a permit had been issued in Germany, which was sufficient to transport dual-use substances 
also via Finland.  
The situation was resolved after four (4) weeks. The captain and the first officer were issued a 
fine for neglecting the seaworthiness of the vessel177. Also, the Finnish Customs continued the 
investigation of the export offence. The missiles and the explosives were declared as lawful 
business and cargo, but the export and transit permits were missing, and the explosives stow-
age had been done wrong. As the interviewee from the National Bureau of Investigation stat-
ed: 
It was a large scale incident but administratively dealt with by issuing a fine. 
The enormous media interest and the size of the cargo made it such a hassle. 
Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation 
Ultimately there were fifteen (15) different entities involved. These entities are pictured in 
Figure 5. Out of these fifteen officials, I interviewed eight (8), and requested for an interview 
from additional two (2). Additionally there are five (5) more entities that have been left out of 
the study due to their supporting role in the case. The arrows in Figure 5 indicate which entity 
initiated the contact.  
The eight (8) interviewed instances were the local Police, the local Police’s Chief Inspector178, 
the National Bureau of Investigation, the Finnish Customs, the Finnish Border Guard, the Fire 
and Rescue Department, the Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi and the Mussalo harbor. 
The additional two requests were sent to the Finnish Defence Forces as well as the Finnish 
Security Intelligence Service. The Finnish Defence Forces’ role will be further elaborated 
below, but as stated earlier, the FSIS’s role remained unclear and has been excluded from this 
study. Each of the agencies have their own area of responsibility, but as many authorities are 
involved in one case, there is bound to be overlapping jurisdictions as was referred to already 
in section 2.5. 
 
                                                 
177 Valtakunnansyyttäjänvirasto 2012.; Käkelä 2012. 
178 The local Police and the Chief Inspector will be explained in the same paragraph. 
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Figure 5: Involved entities in the Thor Liberty –case 
 
Figure 5 presents the agencies were invited to join the case. The arrows indicate which agency 
contacted whom, but it does not indicate the situation management structure. Instead, the situ-
ation management structure is illustrated in Figure 6.  
Eight (8) authorities from where an interview was requested are described in the following 
paragraphs, after which they are presented in Figure 6. An additional interview was requested 
from the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (FSIS). It was left out of the picture as no in-
terview was granted. After that they were left out of this thesis completely as because of their 
line of work, there is not much information available from public sources. With their de-
cline179 it was simple and easy to redefine the more strict research problem, involving only the 
operational parties. Thus, without the interview FSIS is irrelevant to the case.  
While the Port is not an authority, it’s involvement in this study is justified since they control 
the area. Also, they are obliged to hold certain facilities to authorities, and they were respon-
sible for managing the media journalists during the case. All the involved entities are shortly 
introduced below, with also a brief description on their role in the studied case.  
 
                                                 
179 Email from the FSIS. 
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The Finnish Border Guard is a “cooperative, internationally renowned expert in border 
management and maritime safety, an authority that increases the safety and security of peo-
ple”180. It is responsible for border surveillance, border checks, crime prevention, maritime 
safety, international cooperation and national defence. The Finnish Border Guard operates at 
on land, at sea and in the air.181  
The Finnish Border Guard joined the operation on Sunday December 18th. During the Thor 
Liberty case the Finnish Border Guard was called into the operation to ensure that the ship 
would not depart from the Port of HaminaKotka. They deployed a patrol ship to Kotka to pa-
trol at the port and that was operational around the clock. At first their first task was to sup-
port the Fire and Rescue Department. Eventually, their main task was to assist the police by 
cordoning the port from the sea. Since it is not in the Finnish Border Guard’s jurisdiction, 
they were providing assistance to the Fire and Rescue Department with their capabilities, i.e. 
maritime capability.  
 
The Finnish Customs “is a state agency steered by the Ministry of Finance. The Finnish Cus-
toms cooperates with the trade community as well as with domestic and foreign authorities.” 
It facilitates smooth international trade, and supervises the trade’s legality, goods safety, col-
lect some 30% of the Finnish taxes and duties, and offer services for both individuals and 
companies. 182 
The Finnish Customs joined the operation on Tuesday December 20th due to a request to open 
one of the containers containing the Patriot missiles. The Finnish Customs launched their own 
preliminary investigation, regarding the missing documentation and the export offence. The 
Finnish Customs mainly worked together with the National Bureau of Investigation, and was 
responsible for verifying the legitimacy of the explosives and missiles transportation.  
 
The Finnish Defence Forces have three (3) main tasks, which are the military defence of 
Finland, supporting other authorities and participating in international crisis management183. 
During normal conditions the Finnish Defence Forces focus, amongst other things, on devel-
                                                 
180 The Finnish Border Guard (a). 
181 The Finnish Border Guard Functions (b). 
182 The Finnish Customs. 
183 Laki puolustusvoimista 551/2007 § 2. 
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oping their ability to support other authorities, such as the Police, with dangerous situations, 
explosives and weapons cases, and search and rescue operations, etc.184 
The Finnish Defence Forces had multiple roles in the Thor Liberty case. They were called in 
to assess the situation regarding the spilled explosives and also to identify the substance. They 
also identified of the Patriot missiles, and aided in transferring the missiles to a secure area. 
As they are more of an external security authority, they were performing executive assistance 
with the situation commander, Kymenlaakso Fire and Rescue Department, the National Bu-
reau of Investigation and the Finnish Customs.  
 
The Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi) develops the safety of the transport system, 
promotes environmentally friendly transport solutions and is responsible for transport system 
regulatory duties. It supervises transport, and develops transport safety. It is divided into mari-
time, air, road, and railroad transportation.185 
In 2011, as the Thor Liberty reached port, Trafi was the first official the stevedores contacted. 
They conducted the initial inspection, the Port State Control, and seized the ship to the harbor. 
Their main concern was that the 159 tons of explosives had been stowed in violation of the 
international maritime regulations, and ordered them to be re-stowed before releasing the 
ship. Eventually, the ship was released by Trafi, but it could not leave as the captain and the 
first officer were prosecuted. Additionally, their cargo was seized by the Customs. 
 
Port of HaminaKotka, also known as the Mussalo harbor, is located at Southern Finland, 
and includes seven (7) different sections. It is the biggest and most diverse harbor in Finland. 
It has excellent logistics routes both to and from the harbor, and operates regular lines around 
the most significant European harbors. Mussalo is part of the HaminaKotka harbor area. The 
terminals are amongst the busiest in Europe, and the majority of the Finnish transit and export 
transportation go through it.186 
The Thor Liberty was piloted to the harbor, and was later on moved to a more isolated dock 
for unloading and loading. The HaminaKotka personnel were responsible for maintaining the 
                                                 
184 The Finnish Defence Forces. 
185 The Finnish Transport Safety Agency.  
186 Port of HaminaKotka. 
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harbor security and assisting the officials in all needed tasks, including taking the media to the 
site, but keeping them safe and maintaining the uninterrupted area for the authorities. 
 
The local Police and its Chief Inspector at the Kotka Police Station. The Kotka Police Sta-
tion is a local Police Department under the South East Finland’s Police Department. It is re-
sponsible for general order and safety in Kotka region, and also license services187.  
The Kotka Police Department joined the operation on Monday December 19th. In the 2011 
incident, Kotka Police Station’s role was two-fold: supporting the Fire and Rescue Depart-
ment in their actions to prevent a large-scale accident, and investigating whether there was 
any offences in the case. On Tuesday evening on December 20th the Chief Inspector was ap-
pointed to the situation command, but was released from his duties as the National Bureau of 
Investigation took over the task.   
 
Kymenlaakso Fire and Rescue Department (F&R D) is a regional188 authority. It operates 
in the Kotka area, where Mussalo harbor is located. It is responsible for fire and rescue ser-
vices, chimney sweeping, training and first aid.189 
During the Thor Liberty case, the Kymenlaakso Fire and Rescue Department had the overall 
situation management responsibility, with the rescue chief acting as the duty commander. 
This was a natural choice, as the initial alarm regarded a potential explosives incident, and the 
Rescue Act provides sufficient jurisdiction. The Rescue Chief was the second entity on-scene, 
and was invited there by the Finnish Transport Safety Agency’s representative.  
 
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is a unit of the Finnish Police. It is responsible 
for preventing international and organized crime, and other serious criminal activity. It is also 
responsible for preventing money laundering, financing terrorism, amongst other things. They 
operate throughout Finland and is a national Police sector.190 
                                                 
187 The Finnish Police. 
188 Kymenlaakso is a Finnish province including 7 regions east from Helsinki. It is home for some 180 000 peo-
ple. Ref: Kymenlaakson liitto. 
189 Kymenlaakso Rescue Department.  
190 The National Bureau of Investigation.  
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The National Bureau of Investigation’s representative was appointed as the overall situation 
commander regarding the criminal investigation. He replaced the local Police Chief Inspector 
on Wednesday December 21st. Even though he was assigned overall command, a local agree-
ment was made between the NBI and the Finnish Customs on the investigative responsibili-
ties. It was agreed that the neglect on the seaworthiness of the vessel was the NBI’s responsi-
bility.  
 
 
Figure 6: Situation Management structures within the Thor Liberty case 
 
Figure 6 pictures the situation management structures. The National Bureau of Investigation, 
the Finnish Customs and the Fire and Rescue Department are illustrated with a darker circle 
as they are the overall situation commanders whit their operations. Finnish Transport Safety 
Agency is in an advice-giving position, and is hence with a different color. The Finnish De-
fence Forces was providing executive assistance, and while its role is not significantly differ-
ent in this thesis, it is noted in this Figure. All the other agencies were providing interagency 
cooperation, and are thus noted in a coherent way. The arrows indicate which agencies 
worked directly with one another on the scene, and is indicated with a constant line, as with 
for example Customs (C) and the local Police (P). The dotted line indicates that the agencies 
were in contact with each other, like the Finnish Transport Safety Agency and the Finnish 
Customs. The purpose of this picture is to clarify the two situation management structures in 
the incident.  
   44 
 
4.2 Interagency Cooperation with the Thor Liberty case 
As the objective of this research is to understand the different perceptions on interagency co-
operation as it worked with the Thor Liberty case, the phenomenographic analysis was con-
ducted with keeping the objective clear in mind. The first round of categorizing was used to 
highlight the interview statements that were directly or loosely related to interagency coopera-
tion. The statements were then moved to a separate document in order to concentrate on the 
way the statements are said and explained, while still keeping the source (interviewee) code 
attached to the statement (E.g. the Fire and Rescue Department’s answers were marked with 
PH, Pelastustoimen haastateltava). These statements could be categorized into three themes 
that arose from the data, but are also tied to the questionnaire. Due to the thematic interview 
the categories were emphasized in the data: Cooperation, Situation Coordination and Com-
munication. After this categorization, the statements in one category were divided according 
to the authority so that the perception of each agency could be established. After this initial 
categorization the analysis began.  
While reading and analyzing the three categories, subcategories began to emerge. The catego-
ries and the sub-categories that emerged from the data are illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7: Categorization of the data 
 
The sub-categories that emerged from the text related to cooperation are experience, personal 
relations and exercises. For situation coordination the subcategories are overall situation 
command and management board, whereas for communication the discovered subcategories 
are internal, external and organizational (communication). While some parts of the interviews 
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could be placed in more than one category, the overall context of the statement indicated 
where it eventually was categorized. The next step was to describe the different perceptions 
on how the participating entities perceived the subcategory issues. 
 
4.2.1 Theme 1: Cooperation 
Cooperation was a predictable category in this study. However, my focus was to understand 
how cooperation is done and how it is perceived. The subcategories that arose from the data 
were experience, personal relations and exercises. In this chapter, all sub-categories for 
Theme 1: Cooperation will be analyzed. The sub-categories are visualized in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Sub-categories for Cooperation 
 
Experience 
Experience emerged from the data and was referred to in two ways. On the one hand it was 
discussed as operational experience, meaning that the operational environment and the situa-
tion was familiar. On the other hand it was also referred to as routine or everyday work. In 
this case, the routine in working with other authorities and experience with cooperation was 
evident. While routine could be seen as a risk factor, in this case it appeared to further cooper-
ation. 
 
 
 
Cooperation 
 
 
Experience 
 
 
Personal Relations 
 
 
Exercises 
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Yes, we cooperate a lot locally. Nonetheless, these situations are not very com-
mon. 
The Fire and Rescue Department representative 
 
This is a very typical interagency cooperation situation. It was handled with 
routine. 
The local Police representative 
 
In a short period of time there were many organizations present with a positive 
attitude. The case was taken seriously and the dangers were understood. 
Trafi representative  
 
Everything went smoothly with us [between the Customs and the NBI]. The ad-
ministrative level, on the other hand, had some controversy in responsibilities. 
Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation 
 
Locality is a key element in experience. The familiar surroundings including the harbor as a 
critical operational environment require experience to understand who the relevant stakehold-
ers are, and where and why they are needed. The interviews suggest that the experience on 
how to work with other authorities, and what authorities should be present in the situation, is 
extensive in the Kotka region, as is evident from the Fire and Rescue Department representa-
tive’s quotation above. For example, the cordoning of the area requires the overall situation 
command (F&R D) to ask the Police to cordon from the land side, and the Border Guard to 
cordon from the sea side. Thereby the safety of the curious people (general public) and the 
media could be ensured, as was brought forward by the local Police’s Chief Inspector. Locali-
ty is also relevant to exercises which are discussed in section 4.3.3.  
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However, the Fire and Rescue Department representative also states that the situation itself 
and its magnitude were uncommon which contradicts with the local Police representative’s 
perception, as indicated by the second quotation. For the Police, the situation itself as well as 
the cooperation were routine, which comes from experience. The differences in the perception 
are interesting, and could suggest the Police has more experience in big cases and multiagen-
cy cooperation situations than the Fire and Rescue Department.  
The quotation by the National Bureau of Investigation representative indicates that coopera-
tion between two agencies may have different approaches depending on the hierarchical level. 
Experience in cooperation can simplify the cooperation locally, even though the agencies in-
ternal administrative levels might have different opinions and perceptions. Both the Finnish 
Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation stated that the local cooperation succeeded 
well. It succeeded because the person-in-charge from both agencies agreed on the cooperation 
measurements and responsibilities. The agencies’ administrative levels had evidently agreed 
that the NBI will take over the situation command on the criminal case, but the Customs had 
already began with their own preliminary investigations. In order to proceed with the prelimi-
nary investigation an agreement was made of the situation coordination that the responsibili-
ties were shared in accordance with the special knowledge of the issues.  
Experience was also discussed and used as synonyms for routine and everyday work in the 
interviews. Especially the local Police, the Chief Inspector and the NBI representatives em-
phasized that interagency cooperation is routine, and only the scale with the Thor Liberty in-
cident was an anomaly. An interesting contradictory statement relating to routine emerged as 
well. As is suggested by the first quote in this section by the F&R D, these situations are rare. 
Regardless of the risk for routine which may lead to complacency, the discussion and the atti-
tude towards the case showed that the case was taken seriously, as the Trafi representative’s 
quote indicates.  
The differences in perception are expected, as the experiences in cooperating with one another 
differ between the agencies and the persons-in-charge. While drawing the line between expe-
rience and routine may seem artificial, the purpose was to indicate that people perceive expe-
rience differently. Being familiar with the environment and how cooperation works enables 
the participants to focus on the situation rather than concentrating on what should be taken 
into account and with whom.  
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Personal Relations 
Personal relations means knowing the other actors from either previous cooperation or per-
sonally. The previously mentioned locality explains why the authorities are familiar with the 
other authorities. However, if cooperation is dependent on the selected people, it creates a 
risk. Personal relations emerged strongly from the data, as is evident in this subchapter.  
 
Personal relationships are extremely important. It is a part of trust. When you 
can trust that people will do their jobs... …If my experience and expertise is not 
enough, why wouldn’t I trust the expert? We have to trust.  
Chief Inspector [1] 
 
Personal relations affect a lot. It’s human. You work better with people you 
know, whether in cooperation or when providing executive assistance. 
The Finnish Border Guard representatives 
 
You know your counterparts [from other organizations] and building trust is 
easy. It takes time to get to know people, but then you don’t have to think if the 
work will be done, and you will trust them. Also, if someone is, so to say, escort-
ing another person [into the situation] they are vouching that this guy knows 
what he’s doing, you don’t have to question it. 
Chief Inspector [2] 
 
I would assume familiarity with one another makes information exchange easier 
than if you are involved with the situation only through official duty. You’ll 
know what can be told and to whom.  
The local Police’s representative [1] 
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Cooperation here [in Kotka] works very well. We cooperate a lot. However, it is 
very dependent on personal relations. If the people change the cooperation 
might not work as well anymore.  
Port of HaminaKotka representative 
 
We have discussed also this case in coffee table discussions with Trafi and the 
head of the rescue operations. 
The local Police representative [2] 
 
All the interviewed authorities agreed that personal relationships and chemistry are an im-
portant factor when studying why and how interagency cooperation works. It affects trust, and 
as with experience, when you know the people you work with you can concentrate on your 
own tasks. In addition, personal relations are taken for granted. As stated by the interviewees 
from the Finnish Border Guard, any theory regarding leadership or management agrees with 
it, and makes cooperation easier. 
When asked if cooperation would have been as easy or clear if the participants had not been 
familiar from previous occasions, the NBI representative stated the situation may have been 
different. This suggests that while trust is eminent amongst the different agencies, it is empha-
sized if there is previous and existing personal relations. However, it appears that while trust 
emerges from being familiar with the other participants, it can also be passed on to other peo-
ple by introducing them along with the regular point of contact. However, the representative 
from the Port of HaminaKotka suggests that cooperation might not work if people change, 
meaning that cooperation is person-dependent. The data did not reveal if there is a contingen-
cy plan when bringing in new people, but it was indicated by the Chief Inspector [2].  
The local Police representative’s quotation [1] suggests that trust and tacit information are 
both gained through working together. The knowledge of how things are done and with who, 
are transferred from the more experienced people to the less experienced ones, enabling 
smooth transition between people. This is important especially in information exchange, 
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which was indicated in the quotation. However, while knowing people was seen as being 
passed on with the general introductions on the scene, it was also seen as a threat. While fa-
miliarity and shared experiences are good, they might crate inner circles. When asked whether 
the case had been reviewed with other participants, the common answer was that mainly only 
within the agencies. As stated by the F&R D, Trafi and the local Police, they have worked 
together for a long time. Naturally, cooperation works well but it was also stated that cooper-
ating too much creates groups, as with the local Police representative suggested. Only the 
local Police, the Fire and Rescue Department and Trafi representatives, who knew each other 
well already before the case, had had a casual review on the case. They had processed the case 
sitting in a coffee table, while the other participants had not had a similar debriefing or Les-
sons Learned -discussion. 
While trust appears to be the corner stone in cooperation and is part of personal relations, the 
data suggests that trust is not affected by chemistry. Cooperation works and trust maintains 
with personal relationships, even if chemistry does not exist. Personal relations and familiarity 
with the people you work with are important in cooperation. It works better in all cooperation, 
be it between two or more organizations, or just within an organization. While trust can be 
built by proving the professionalism and expertise in a shared situation, it can also be passed 
on. This requires planning from within the organizations as people are reassigned and the suc-
cessor comes along. When comparing the significance of personal relations with other themes 
that emerged from the data, this raised the most unanimous perception within the interview-
ees. Also, a debriefing on the case was done unofficially and only amongst three participating 
entities. This might explain why the perceptions between the different authorities were so 
different, as the interviews were conducted 4-5 years after the case. 
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Exercises  
As stated before, experience and shared exercises are both typical in local cooperation. Exer-
cises were another emerging sub-category from the data. Exercises are regular in Kotka be-
cause of the harbor, where the cargo also includes dangerous goods and substances.  
 
We cooperate a lot locally. The different entities in this region have good pre-
paredness plans, including the harbor. A big exercise is arranged approximately 
once every year.  
The Fire and Rescue Department representative 
 
Interagency cooperation is big. However, even in the exercises it is not always 
clear who is in charge.  
Port of HaminaKotka representative 
 
It was lucky that the person happened to be on duty then, although he would 
have been assigned to this case anyway. 
The Finnish Border Guard representatives [1] 
 
If Customs is involved with the exercises at the harbor, not including them from 
the beginning to the case is against the general practice. 
The Chief Inspector 
 
There could be some exercises. Maybe even desk-top or map exercises. Howev-
er, I think the operation went well without them as well.  
Trafi representative 
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Lessons Learned from this case have been applied, and the situation manage-
ment system has been improved.  
The Finnish Border Guard representatives [2] 
 
Regardless of the regular exercises, the same issues emerged in the real situation as in the 
exercises. It seems that the responsibility of the overall situation command appeared to be 
unclear to many participants who either observed the situation or joined in when the criminal 
case emerged, as indicated by the representative from the Port of HaminaKotka. However, 
despite the previously referred quotation, the exercises are also valued and seen as a positive 
effect on how interagency cooperation works in the case. The Finnish Border Guard stated 
that the Fire and Rescue Department representative had been involved in the local exercises 
many times in planning and executing them. The differences in perception suggest that the 
Finnish Border Guard is in an assisting role in the exercises as with the Thor Liberty case, 
which clarifies the situation. However, as it was unclear for some other participants it can 
indicate the debriefing or Lessons Learned were not conducted after the exercise, or that the 
Lessons Learned were not implemented. This issue could be discussed amongst the different 
agencies  
Even though the F&R D representative has been organizing and attending the many exercises, 
it was unclear why the Customs were not included in the case from the very beginning. There 
is a clear division in perceptions here. While the Customs is included in all exercises at the 
harbor, their presence in a case taking place in the harbor was not evaluated necessary as they 
have no role in a rescue operation. Albeit this comes from the legislation, Customs is the only 
authority stationed regularly in the Mussalo harbor. Also, as cargo and goods inspection falls 
under Customs jurisdiction and the cargo was what was causing the danger, so the debate 
emerging from the interviews is interesting.  
The again, when asked about taking part in the exercises, it was evident they are conducted on 
the operational level. The Customs Economic Crime Investigation Unit had not been involved 
with the exercises, but the operational level had. Also, the National Bureau of Investigation 
disclosed they have not been involved into similar exercises. Also Trafi pointed out, some sort 
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of exercises, even the so called map- or table top exercises would be welcome. This indicated 
that exercises could be elaborated to cover more agencies and hierarchical levels as well. 
Even without exercises lessons can be learned. The Finnish Border Guard expressed they had 
implemented a new situation management system, but it had not been tested in a real situa-
tion. By reviewing the situation their own system has been improved.  
All in all, exercises are a good way to get to know the other authorities’ representatives, and 
to build trust. Gaining experience from working together and from shared situations in exer-
cises can further cooperation. Interestingly the same issues emerged in this case as with the 
exercises in terms of leadership and coordination. Also, the different levels and functions 
from the participating entities might not have had the same experience, which is logical. Local 
exercises focus on improving the local operational functions and cooperation and the Eco-
nomic Crime Investigation Unit and other more administrative entities and levels are not in-
cluded. Whether arranging such exercises is possible should be assessed by the experts and 
cooperative bodies. 
 
4.2.2 Theme 2: Situation Coordination 
Situation coordination is at the center of the theoretical model I introduced in chapter 2.6. The 
data revealed it can be viewed from two levels: overall situation command and the manage-
ment board. The overall situation command is the responsible authority, which is dependent 
on the situation and the related legislation. The sub-categories are also illustrated in figure 9 
below.  
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Figure 9: Sub-categories for Situation Coordination 
 
Overall Situation Command 
The emerging themes from the data reveal a significant difference in perceptions related to 
which operation the interviewees took part in. The rescue operation was initially agreed in the 
management board by all participants, meaning that the overall situation command was as-
sumed by the Fire and Rescue Department. As stated in chapter 4.1, another situation man-
agement structure emerged as the criminal case began. These two organizations appeared not 
to be very clear to all participants, and the data suggests a silo effect was also evident.  
 
We assumed the overall situation command. We laid down the legislation and 
the sections, and nobody challenged it.  
The Fire and Rescue Department representative [1] 
 
The head of the shared preliminary investigations group and the head of the 
Customs preliminary investigations coordinated with one another with the oper-
ations conducted at the harbor and the vessel. Also, we both coordinated with 
the overall situation command of the security issues, i.e. the Fire and Rescue 
Department’s representative.  
Finnish Customs representatives [1] 
 
 
Situation Coordination 
 
 
Situation Command 
 
 
Management Board 
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§36191 was not given up, so we could get things done more easily… …With a 
rescue operation the Fire and Rescue Department’s jurisdiction is more exten-
sive than in a normal situation. 
Fire and Rescue Department representative [2] 
 
The overall situation command was clearly with the Fire and Rescue Depart-
ment until a certain point, when they stepped aside. 
The local Police representative 
 
In a multiagency cooperation situation, the coordination of situation command 
of all participating authorities is highlighted.  
Finnish Customs representatives [2] 
 
There was a slight confusion in who had the overall situation commander. As 
long as there was the dangerous situation [due to the explosives] of course it 
was with the Fire and Rescue Department. To get the acute danger under con-
trol. 
Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation [1] 
 
 
 
                                                 
191 Pelastuslaki § 36 1: In order to extinguish fires and prevent them from spreading and to prevent other acci-
dents… … have the right, when the situation cannot otherwise be controlled, to: 4) take any other action as re-
quired by rescue operations. 
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 [The head of the NBI investigations unit told me] to assume overall situation 
command of the criminal case. If the other party doesn’t know about it how 
should I take it? Should I go there and stamp my feet to get it? It would not get 
us anywhere… …everything worked well with the local agreement on coopera-
tion. 
Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation [2] 
 
There was no silo effect. There might be situations where the situation command 
is not clear… …is it clear who has what jurisdiction? It is very important. 
The Fire and Rescue Department representative [3] 
 
As long as people keep to their own jurisdiction, everything goes well regardless 
of the number of entities present. However, the minute you cross the line, there 
is going to be trouble. Now, the participants in the rescue operations had also 
talked to the media about the criminal case, which in the worst case scenario 
can harm the investigation. It is important to mind your own business.  
Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation [3] 
 
Initially the case was clearly managed by the Fire and Rescue Department. This was also stat-
ed by all other authorities. However, as the Patriot missiles were discovered the overall situa-
tion command was challenged. The National Bureau of Investigation was commanded to as-
sume the overall situation command of the criminal case, where the two main cooperating 
authorities were Customs and the NBI. As is visible in the quotations, the situation command 
maintained with the F&R D.  
The different perceptions and the confusion in the overall situation command is referred to the 
jurisdiction. As indicated, the Fire and Rescue Department representative perceived the whole 
case as the emergency situation, whereas the NBI and the Customs representatives viewed it 
as the criminal case. While the division of the two separate command structures appeared to 
work, it might indicate a silo effect and a slight power play.  
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This might be confusion on my side, or it might be a difference in opinion. Despite which one 
it is, this issue was also discussed by Kivelä in his dissertation. As already stated in chapter 
4.2.1, an analysis of the situation afterwards, or collecting Lessons Learned, might help in 
similar situations and confusion. The other interpretation of this situation could be that the 
different perceptions were created by the silo effect. 
The criminal investigation was managed in cooperation with the Customs and the NBI. How-
ever, it also had some issues, mainly on the administrative level. The perceptions that 
emerged from the data were very similar, but the National Bureau of Investigations repre-
sentative addressed frustration towards the agencies administrative level of the head of the 
NBI Investigations unit and the National Board for Customs, as was also discussed in section 
4.2.1.  
With the situation command the silo effect emerged in a different way as well. What makes 
this interesting is that the majority of the interviewees stated there was no silo effect present, 
however some did call for it. The Fire and Rescue Department representative’s [3] and the 
National Bureau of Investigation representative’s [3] difference in perception is significant 
and interesting. Since the silo effect in general is seen as bad it mostly is not desired. Howev-
er, it appears that the silo effect could also prove to be useful or necessary, as the criminal 
cases usually have critical phases where especially communicating to the media is restricted 
to the minimal.  
All authorities agreed there were not too many authorities present, but it was acknowledged 
that the more there are different entities, the more coordination it requires. Especially coordi-
nating the media proved to be difficult. The participating entities had agreed that they would 
answer to the media on issues concerning themselves, which worked well for the most part. 
However, the National Bureau of Investigation stated that by commenting to the media about 
the criminal case the preliminary investigation was nearly compromised. 
Despite the many issues that emerged from the data, the interagency cooperation worked. 
These issues arise in the exercises and the real situations, but do not hinder the cooperation. 
Hence, the points of improvement could be seen as refining cooperation. And, as stated by the 
Finnish Border Guard representative, the only thing that can be improved on a national level 
is to clarify the legislation, which directly affects and mandated the jurisdictions of the agen-
cies. This was also argued by Juhani Kivelä.  
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Management Board 
The management board formed to assist the overall situation command was another aspect of 
the situation coordination. The management board included a representative of each partici-
pating entity. The management board worked as a board of experts, where all issues could be 
discussed and a decision could be made jointly. All of the authorities had the same perception 
about this. 
 
Situation coordination happens when many people-in-charge get together to co-
ordinate. The authorities may have overlapping jurisdiction, but different objec-
tives. They just need to be coordinated. 
The Finnish Border Guard representatives 
 
The good thing with a management board is that you have the different authori-
ties around one table. All decisions will base on all the expertise.  
The local Police representative 
 
That is why the persons-in-charge sat in the press conference. Because they all 
had their own sectors.  
The Finnish Border Guard representatives 
 
As the management board was discussed more, its benefits were explained. It was emphasized 
that the group worked like colleagues or peers rather than a hierarchical organization. Even 
with the overall situation command all decisions were made together.  
The management board’s expertise was also perceived as very good in a press conference. 
There all questions could be answered by the entity under whose jurisdiction any one issue 
fell. Even when the media’s need for information was criticized, all entities seemed satisfied 
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that all the responsible persons-in-charge attended and assembled around the table. This was 
indicated by the Finnish Border Guard representatives, and is seen in their quotation before.  
Even though the management board was not discussed extensively during the interviews, it is 
significant that all participants were very satisfied with the temporary body. The board acted 
as an organization of specialists, or an ad-hoc organization, where everyone was perceived as 
an equal. It also brought together the authorities that would not necessarily otherwise cooper-
ate closely, like for example the Customs and Trafi with the Thor Liberty case. The Customs 
wanted to detain the captain and the first officer and take them into custody onshore. Trafi 
advised that it was not possible due to the weather conditions and because the two people in 
question were the responsible personnel for safety onboard. Thus, the interrogations were 
conducted onboard the vessel instead. Without the management board the information flow to 
Trafi might have taken longer, and was another reason why it was perceived as good and 
functional.  
 
4.2.3 Theme 3: Communication 
Communication is a key part of leadership. Some even say leadership is communication. 
Therefore it was initially included into the questionnaire. Interestingly it emerged strongly 
from the data with three different aspects: internal communications meaning the communica-
tion within the situation amongst the authorities, external communications with the media, 
and organizational communication within the participating entities and their steering minis-
tries and hierarchical levels in their administration. The sub-categories are visualized in Fig-
ure 10 below.  
 
  
Figure 10: Sub-categories for Communication 
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Internal 
Here, internal communication refers to information exchange between the participating au-
thorities including both cases. Information exchange is considered critical when working to-
gether, and especially when some participants join the operation later than others. Then, col-
lecting the real time picture of the situation defines what has been done and what needs to be 
done. However, there appeared to be some issues hindering the information exchange, and 
also some room for improvement. 
 
We found it problematic that the Customs, as the supervisory authority on car-
go, could not get the information on what had been done with the cargo and the 
vessel prior to calling us when we first came to the situation.  
The Finnish Customs representatives 
 
Information exchange works well when you are sitting in a table agreeing on is-
sues. But as the electronic means like the TETRA-network with restricted call 
groups… …it might be that people do not know [about the limitations] or that 
they don’t remember. 
Port of HaminaKotka representative 
 
At some point it would have been good if we [the rescue operation and the crim-
inal case] would have sat down and agreed on certain principles on what and 
how to communicate with the media. As we did with the Customs in the prelimi-
nary investigation case. 
Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation 
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I’d say the most challenging issue in these cases is information exchange. The 
media may be providing information that has not been delivered within the or-
ganization. 
The Chief Inspector 
 
With these cases where the time span is long, there are fewer approaches as to 
how information should be exchanged. It was evident in the management board 
– we wanted to have a person-in-charge there. 
The Finnish Border Guard representatives 
 
As the representatives from the Finnish Customs indicated, it was hard to receive all infor-
mation on the case when they first entered the situation. It was also brought forward by the 
National Bureau of Investigation. Also, the two lines of operation had some difficulties in 
communications. As the Port of HaminaKotka representative’s quotation above suggests face-
to-face meetings were good at updating and sharing information. A possible explanation on 
why information exchange was challenging could be that the persons-in-charge on the crimi-
nal case were at times spread around the South of Finland, which may have hindered to coor-
dination of information exchange. Eventually the information was received and the situation 
picture was established.  
Internal information exchange means leadership, and vice versa. While this issue was not dis-
cussed too much, some entities had a wishful perception that it should be improved. The Chief 
Inspector perceived internal communications as a worrying challenge, as is indicated by his 
quotation. Media was an additional stake holder that had to be taken into account, and infor-
mation flow should to be ensured within the case participants.  
While the quotation suggests that information was not shared within the situation organiza-
tion, it can also mean that the ad-hoc organization did not get all necessary information. No 
solutions for improving internal communications emerged from the data. Interestingly the 
management board was not actively referred to as means of information exchange per se, but 
in chapter 4.2.2 it was seen as a way for internal communications. The references towards the 
Management Board were discussed previously. 
   62 
 
Information exchange by any means necessary is important. As there are two parallel situa-
tions it also meant that the exchange should have been verified and emphasized. In this case it 
proved to be difficult partly because of the technical equipment, but also partly because of the 
different situation commands. The slow pace may have had an effect on the case, and could 
be focused on in some of the exercises already mentioned previously. 
 
External 
External communication emerged in the interviews abundantly. It was perceived as an exter-
nal stress factor, which created additional pressure when dealing with the case. Also, the me-
dia attention appeared to take a great deal of time from the participants. 
 
Interagency cooperation worked well. What could be improved was the general 
mayhem, the journalists’ need for information and the additional work from the 
media coverage. And other additional pressure 
The Chief Inspector 
 
The majority of work in the beginning was communications. There was no time 
for anything else. 
Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation [1] 
 
All the [media] attention focused on the Patriots whereas the explosives were 
what made the situation dangerous. 
Representative from the Port of HaminaKotka 
 
The mayhem in this case was purely media-related. You get cautious.  
Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation [2] 
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The limited resources of the participating agencies emerged from the data in relation to the 
media. They provided all the substance knowledge to the journalists. However, the press was 
logistically managed by the harbor. Thus, as they were toured in the harbor it was done in 
conjunction firstly due to the limitation in movement at the harbor, but also to keep them safe. 
Still, while the media was managed physically by the representative from the Port of 
HaminaKotka, the phone kept ringing, as indicated by the representative from the National 
Bureau of Investigation. As to the continuity of the media attention, it lasted the whole inci-
dent until January 2012.  
The general perception of all the authorities that participated to the rescue operation perceived 
the initial situation, albeit dangerous due to the explosives, still manageable and calm. As the 
Patriot missiles were discovered the media became even more interested in the situation. As 
stated by the representative from the harbor, all media attention focused on the Patriots even 
though the explosives were causing the threat for a large scale accident. As the media became 
more interested, the authorities gained more pressure, as is indicated in the quotation of the 
representative from the National Bureau of Investigation. 
While the media and the general public has the right to know and all government activities are 
to be open and public192, the authorities need to make sure the operations are not compro-
mised. To make sure that only the public information was released to the press, the responsi-
bility for communicating the organizations’ responsibilities was agreed to the organizations 
themselves. I.e. the Finnish Border Guard was to comment on their own tasks etc. However, 
emerging from the data was that initially the responsibility was with Trafi, and then it was 
transferred to the Fire and Rescue Department. As stated by the NBI representative and quot-
ed in the previous sub-category, there could have been more discussion between the two oper-
ations. The need for this appeared to increase as the distance between the participants in-
creased, as the Customs and the NBI were discussing with the Office of the Prosecutor Gen-
eral in Helsinki, meaning that the spatial distance increased significantly.  
 
Organizational 
The organizational communication means providing information within an organization. As 
the steering ministries also need to be informed about the on-going security situation especial-
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ly when it is interesting to the media as well, the operational level needs to ensure the right 
information reaches the relevant entities. This was very visible also in the Thor Liberty case. 
Yet, the interest seemed to be extensive also from the administrative and ministry side. 
 
 The president did not call but it was not short from that. 
The Chief Inspector 
 
It wouldn’t be too hard to use project files on a SharePoint or some other plat-
form. Something like a diary. But then who would manage and update it… 
Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation 
 
In less than one hour the Commander of the Gulf of Finland Coast Guard was 
informed as well as out general headquarters, which is significant because then 
the information goes also to the ministry. However, the information was proba-
bly at the Ministry of Interior already delivered by the Fire and Rescue Depart-
ment.  
The Finnish Border Guard representatives 
 
The general perception amongst all interviewees was that keeping their steering ministries 
updated on the situation was important. However, as stated by the different Police representa-
tives the hierarchical levels were very interested in the case. Amongst all the media trying to 
reach them on the phone also the high command called for information. This indicates that 
information exchange or information sharing within the organizations was dependent on one 
person, but also towards the media.  
As suggested by the representative from the National Bureau of Investigations, a technical 
solution could help with internal communications both within the organization but also within 
                                                                                                                                                        
192 Laki viranomaistoiminnan julkisuudesta 621/1999. 
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the case amongst all participating agencies. However, implementing a shared platform or sys-
tem for cooperation or situation picture without agreeing on the responsibilities beforehand 
was seen as a risk, as was stated by the representative from the National Bureau of Investiga-
tion. 
With the Ministry of the Interior being the steering ministry for the Fire and Rescue Depart-
ment, the Police and the Finnish Border Guard, information flow to that ministry was good. It 
indicated how exceptional situation the Thor Liberty case was. This was indicated by the 
Finnish Border Guard representatives.  
All in all, the internal information flow within an organization was perceived challenging by 
the participants in the criminal case. Initially it was difficult to form the situation picture for 
the crime case as the Finnish Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation joined the 
operation later on. But then providing information within the organizations to the National 
Police Board, the head NBI crime unit or the General Headquarters with everything that was 
happening on the scene required coordination. As the Fire and Rescue Department and Trafi 
indicated nothing similar, it made me ponder whether it was because the attending people 
were the ones to whom the reports usually are delivered. Indeed, whatever the reason is, or-
ganizational communication required coordination.  
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4.2.4 Outcome Spaces of the sub-categories 
The Outcome space of the sub-categories are said to be the essence of a phenomenographic 
analysis. They are formed from the sub-categories, and can be seen the underlying common 
nominator of all sub-categories. My interpretation of the outcome spaces, or the common 
nominators from the sub-categories, are Familiarity, Working as peers and Discourse. The 
whole categorization process is illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11: Phenomenographical categorization 
 
Familiarity withholds experience, personal relations and exercises. By attending shared exer-
cises also trust can be shared onwards, similarly as tacit information is gained or brought 
forth. Experience in working together can be practiced in shared exercises. Hence, all three 
aspects form an outcome space where cooperation can be enforced, and experiences shared 
with one another. Familiarity in personal relations, whoever, should not be limited to the most 
familiar people, when it comes to reviewing the case. As was stated, the review was done in 
casual conversations or locally, rather than in with all the participating entities by collcting 
Lessons Learned.  
The outcome space Working as peers covers the overall situation coordination and the man-
agement board. As emerged very clearly from the data, leading interagency cooperation is 
coordination. The overall situation command can be a discussed or challenged position and 
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may be changed during the whole duration of a case, depending on what the situation is. 
However, the ad-hoc team or the management board will remain. This means that regardless 
of the steering legislation, the participating entities will still be working together as peers, 
providing input from their own area of expertise, i.e. their jurisdiction. Hence, Working as 
peers outcome space describes the operation on the scene.  
Discourse is the third outcome space in this thesis. Communications is all about discourse 
regardless between whom it is done, or by using what means. Communications is enormously 
important in everyday life but especially in shared situations like the Thor Liberty. It could be 
safe to say that some issues emerging from the data, and the perceptions of how interagency 
cooperation worked, may have been different with proper discourse.  
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5 HOW DID IT WORK AND WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM IT? 
Familiarity means knowing and having personal relationships with other people as well as 
shared experiences, either from exercises or from real operations. Indeed, as was emerged 
from the data, it could be argued that familiarity means trust. Cooperation is easier if the par-
ticipating entities trust one another, so it simplifies and facilitates working together and the 
mandatory information exchange.  
On a wider context familiarity and trust can interestingly be passed on to the successor or oth-
er colleagues. That is, if an organization has enabled a smooth transition phase, and the substi-
tute or successor can join in and learn tacit information alongside with the experienced per-
sonnel. Likewise, it can be perceived as an inner circle, and the easiest way in is to join some-
one who is already in the circle and perceived as trustworthy.  
Trust was also pointed as one of the fundamental characteristics of cooperation. It logically 
falls under leadership in the fourfold typology, as trust is usually personal. Even though a 
general trust between authorities exist, it is usually personified with someone, which creates a 
risk. If cooperation is dependent on one person, what happens to it when the personnel is reas-
signed? 
Similarly, over-familiarity creates a risk. If there are people who know one another very well, 
and other people who are not as friendly, communication might be affected. This might be 
intentional or unintentional, with the latter option being the most probable. Some issues are 
discussed within the peers and closest colleagues while it should also be communicated to the 
less-familiar people. This is but a natural habit, as lunch, coffee or other social happenings are 
many times spent with friends. The spatial distance might also come into question whilst pon-
dering the difficulties and reasons behind the problems with information exchange.  
Cooperation was very evident as a local phenomenon. Many of the participating entities had 
worked together before the Thor Liberty case, and regular exercises are held in the Mussalo 
harbor. This enabled the assembly of the different authorities efficiently as the threshold of 
calling to the contact points was low. In contrast, if a similar case was happening in a larger 
city like Helsinki, the results of a similar study would likely differ. The differences would 
most probably be with familiarity and shared exercises, as the more there is people in the local 
agencies the more likely it is that their paths have never crossed before. However, some of the 
entities such as the National Bureau of Investigation, the Finnish Border Guard and the Cus-
toms Economic Crime Investigation Unit are national, but they were also familiar to the local 
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authorities. Hence, my research complies with Valtonen’s Fundamentals of the Operating 
Environment, more specifically the synergy from limited resources section, as familiarity goes 
beyond locality. 
Therefore, despite the general perception in the data that familiarity is seen as a positive phe-
nomenon, the risks need to be managed to ensure continuity of well-functioning cooperation. 
While familiarity and the associated trust could be seen as a significant factor in cooperation, 
the mutual trust amongst the different agencies should overcome the possible situations, 
where personal relations are still being developed.  
The second outcome space Working as Peers is basically leadership and interagency coopera-
tion. Interagency cooperation requires a situation commander as any operation. However, a 
hierarchical structure creates disputes amongst the participants. Still, the management board 
was perceives as a neutral and well-functioning body that was described with the words col-
league-like and peer.  
Indeed, for a near hierarchical commanding structure to work, the resources and jurisdiction 
should be almost identical. If the jurisdiction and tasks differ significantly, it is unlikely that 
the other authority’s jurisdiction is sufficiently familiar as to know what can be done and what 
not, as was set as a requirement by Takamaa. In these situations it is important to have the 
support and expertise in the management group, whose objective is, after all, to support the 
overall situation commander. This belongs to the fundamentals of the operating environment: 
issues that the coordinator needs to acknowledge, but cannot affect directly.  
Inviting people to work as peers rather than subordinates might also be easier to comprehend 
and accept. It is very similar to project work, where the project manager is responsible of the 
overall situation, but the operational work is done by the people who have know-how. How-
ever, the key would be to communicate and agree on the terms and tasks so that no assump-
tions are left to hinder the situation or operational work. This could also be discussed with 
Leena Paukkunen’s dissertation’s results, which suggest that working together (as peers) with 
people from different organizations (backgrounds) will develop cooperation.  
As to the fourfold typology of leadership, overall situation command falls under management, 
where tasks are identified and allocated to others. However, it cannot be completely separated 
from the organizational structure and culture, i.e. the operational environment. Coordinating 
any situation is highly dependent on the environmental factors: who is involved due to the 
special characteristics of the location, what legislation applies to the case, to name a few.  
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The third outcome space Discourse is, in my opinion, the key to functioning cooperation. 
Some might argue the key to cooperation is trust, but I perceive trust as the foundation for 
cooperation, on which everything else is built upon. Discourse, however, covers all sorts of 
communication: communicating within the case; communications with the media; and com-
munications within the respective organization. If information is not shared first and foremost 
within the operation, it could create difficult situations with regards the media, and also within 
the organizations.  
As the data revealed, the easiest and the most clear way to exchange information is through 
face-to-face meetings. Still, as the operations (the rescue operation and the criminal case) are 
different by nature, shared meetings are not always an option. While it is unlikely that anyone 
would deliberately not share some information, it is a risk as long as the operational systems 
and agreements are not established. One option could be to create a shared platform, as sug-
gested by the NBI representative. Nevertheless, the management board is again to be consid-
ered as a viable option for interagency cooperation.  
Situation picture is the culmination point of communication. While it is a useful tool for coor-
dinating the situation on-scene, it is also needed and used at the governmental level. Especial-
ly in situations such as the Thor Liberty case information flow down to the administration is 
important. To elaborate, cases where the international dimension is strong due to e.g. the un-
authorized missiles and the violation of international maritime legislation, media will be inter-
ested. In addition to that, the authorities represented or were steered by four ministries193, and 
hence the situation requires clear information exchange and coordination. The situation pic-
ture needs to be timely, comprehensive and verified, which requires discourse between the 
participating entities. This has already been developed further by implementing the Prime 
Minister’s office’s situation center. Indeed, while the structure already exists its role in such 
cases could still be not only practiced but regularized by legislation, as was suggested in ref-
erence to situation command. While the Situation center would not be in charge of the situa-
tion, the role could be to ensure information is shared to the ministries. 
As with the outcome space for Working as peers, also Discourse is related to management 
and the fundamentals of the operating environment. However, leadership should also be con-
sidered. As with familiarity, discourse should be easier with mutual trust and respect.  
                                                 
193 The Customs is steered by the Ministry of Finance; the different Police, the Fire and Rescue Department as 
well as the Finnish Border Guard are steered by the Ministry of Interior; the Finnish Defence Forces is steered by 
the Ministry of Defence; and Trafi is steered by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
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The results suggest a significant resemblance to Valtonen’s driving forces. Trust is evident. 
Indeed, in my opinion this thesis’ outcome spaces and Valtonen’s other Fundamental Charac-
teristics of Cooperation are in harmonization with one another. While trust was evident also 
with my thesis, it merely emphasizes how important mutual trust is. It also can facilitate co-
operation and coordination. As stated before I think trust forms the foundation on well-
functioning interagency cooperation. 
Team work competence reflects to the management board, where receiving information and 
providing expertise and input on the relevant jurisdiction enables efficient cooperation. Fur-
thermore, willingness to cooperate and commitment emerged also from the data. While the 
research regarding multiagency cooperation is limited, I suggest my thesis supports Valto-
nen’s research, and adds to its validity. 
As to the Fundamentals of the Operating Environment, the same themes emerged from my 
data. While the analysis does not directly support all fundamentals, like the successful 
cooperation in all operational levels due to the disputes on the administrative level, the 
themes were still found from the Thor Liberty case. The most significant of these driving 
forces in relation to the phenomenographical analysis were The Finnish Interagency 
Cooperation works and Safety and Security overpowering disputes. Dispite the differences in 
opinion the cooperation worked, and all participating entities trusted it would. The details that 
emerged from the analysis can be seen as refining the routine to make cooperation even more 
easy and better.  
As to the weak signals, I was surprised that they are identifiable from the analysis. Power play 
creates risks in the success of cooperation. It is closely related to the overall situation 
command, and could be avoided by emphasising on the management board. To get a clear 
picture on what happened, and in order to identify the risks, all the participating entities could 
(have) hold a Lessons Learned- or a debreafing session. The overall perception I got from 
listening to the interviews repeatedly, transcribing them and then analysing the data is that 
people tend to assume and expect things, resulting into a possible misscommunication 
situation as they are not said out loud.  
The weak signal personification was an identified risk. While it supports trust and facilitates 
coordination, also the continuation of the tradition could be taken into account. Eventhough 
trust can be tranferred in a similar way as tacit information, the contingency planning requires 
time where the successor is learning routine from the expert. That is to ensure the traditions 
and customs are not lost as someone is reassigned.  
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Paukkunen’s research on how individuals learn by working and discussing in groups, where 
the people are from different back grounds, is interesting. In my opinion, the model could be 
applied to interagency cooperation. While the agencies design and complete regular shared 
exercises where they can learn how the other agencies work, the briefs on how the exercise 
went are usually about the operational work. As stated by many interviewees, additional 
exercises with unconventional levels or branches of the organizations attending could be 
organized. In such case it could provide fruitful to discuss also the perceptions on interagency 
cooperation as was done in Paukkunen’s research. The end result could firstly increase 
familiarity of the attendees, and secondly also help them understand the different agendas of 
the agenciesm, and also to see how and why the shared case is handled differently. 
All in all the results received with phenomenography are somewhat similar that what Valto-
nen suggested in his comprehensive research. Thus, it is safe to assume that the fundamentals 
for interagency cooperation have been identified, and apply very well to this specific case 
study.  
As to the research question How did interagency cooperation work with the Thor Liberty 
case? and why?, the collective opinion of the interviewees is it worked well. It worked well 
because it is necessary due to the jurisdiction restriction, the small country with limited re-
sources, the will to do so and the multilateral trust. While there appeared to be some aspects to 
improve, it is merely a good thing. As the operational environment changes, the cooperation 
and coordination measures also need to follow the change.  
In terms of the situation coordination figure presented in chapter 2.6, situation coordination is 
not an easy task. It was evident with the interviews and was also suggested by Juhani Kivelä 
in his dissertation. The Finnish Border Guard suggested it would be regulated by law. Wheth-
er or not it would work I have no answers or competence to try and evaluate it. According to 
the interviews, however, an apparently successful alternative is to coordinate the situation 
with the management board. Also, should there be overlapping jurisdiction as was with the 
criminal case, a local agreement appeared to work well. All in all, this issue should be dis-
cussed on many levels, and practiced in exercises.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
The Thor Liberty case displays the complexity of interagency cooperation. The timely topic 
of interagency cooperation can, and has been, studied from many different angles. Indeed, the 
research that is publicly available is just the tip of the ice berg as many studies and reports 
concerning the operational level are restricted. Therefore ensuring this thesis is public was a 
key concern from the beginning of the research process, and naturally contributed to the defi-
nitions and research approach of this thesis. The research problem how did interagency coop-
eration work with the Thor Liberty case? is wide, and could also be approached from many 
disciplines and thus the definitions were constructed with leadership and the case study re-
search method.  
Leadership was an obvious selection as the research approach due to the department to which 
this thesis is done. Also, by studying how interagency cooperation was lead and directing the 
questions on how the attendees perceived the situation was lead, the publicity of this thesis 
could be predicted. The chosen research method in addition to the data collection method 
were logical choices for this research. Thematic interviews are usually used as the primary 
data collection method with phenomenography. Naturally, collecting the subjective opinions 
of the representatives and analyzing them with a method that requires also the researcher’s 
own experience affects the objectivity and repeatability of the research, and the generalization 
of the results. This is further discussed in chapter 6.1. 
The main results indicated that Vesa Valtonen’s results were applicable also to this case. Or, 
inversely, the results of this thesis support Valtonen’s research. Either way, it could be con-
sidered significant as there are so few public research on interagency cooperation. However, 
while the results are similar they are not comparable due to the sampling and research meth-
ods. The critique is further discussed in the next chapter. 
Phenomenography proved to be a fine choice to analyze the data. The categorization emerged 
themes and categories: The themes were cooperation, situation coordination and communica-
tion. These were also directed by the thematic interviews. The sub-categories for cooperation 
were experience, personal relations and exercises. They all contribute to cooperation. Situa-
tion coordination was divided into two sub-categories: overall situation, and management 
board. They can see as tools on how situation coordination can be done. And finally, commu-
nication was divided into internal, external and organizational (communication). The three 
outcome spaces of the sub-categories are familiarity for the sub-categories for cooperation; 
working as peer for the situation coordination sub-categories; and discourse for the communi-
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cations sub-category. As the thesis was sent for the review round for the interviewed authori-
ties, the results were also agreed with by them as an unofficial side product. This creates va-
lidity to the thesis, while still reaffirms the subjectivity. Still, it also indicates that I have man-
aged to be true to the data. 
As for the discussion, Valtonen’s Fundamentals were complemented by the research results of 
this thesis. While the Weak Signals were not extensively discussed in the interviews, they 
emerged from the data. This might be explained with the differences in the research methods 
as well as the extensiveness and comprehensiveness of the research. Still, it was surprising 
that they emerged from the data. 
Also Kivelä’s research results were very visible in this analysis. The silo effect and the prob-
lems with coordination and leadership were still unclear. Hence, the outcome space Working 
as peers, meaning that rather than leadership the authorities could have a management board, 
and the possible misunderstanding on who is in charge could be avoided.  
Familiarity as an outcome space describes the situational context. People know one another 
personally or professionally and they also have experience in working and cooperating to-
gether, but also they have attended joined exercises. While this result presents a great alike-
ness with Valtonen’s results and the Fundamental Characteristics of Cooperation, it also ech-
oes towards the weak signals and a risk for too much familiarity. If the personal relations are 
not spread around it may hinder the cooperation as there are personnel changes. This is 
somewhat pitiful as the results indicate that trust can relatively easily be passed on to another 
person by simply involving them into the cooperative situations.  
As to the Discourse outcome space, it is a very typical issue to improve, and it is a central part 
of leadership. While the issue is acknowledged there seemed not to be any direct improve-
ments available, in addition to the technology. Discussion was also raised that if there were 
the technological solutions for keeping and sharing the situation picture, who would be re-
sponsible for updating it.  
Paukkunen’s approach on developing coordination by discussion with people from different 
backgrounds in exercises could work as a method for collecting and sharing Lessons Learned, 
or in a debriefing situation. While the objective of this thesis was not to present suggestion on 
improvements, my wish is to offer some thoughts and arise awareness on the issues to the 
agencies as to what could be used to improve cooperation.  
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All in all the situation coordination is the most significant issue to improve. While the man-
agement board or local agreements appeared to work, I believe they were very much depend-
ent on the situation as well as familiarity. Management board enabled the different agencies to 
work as peers, and it also enabled good communication while it was assembled. As such, the 
three outcome spaces that emerged from the data keep appearing in accordance with the situa-
tion command, indicating the results form a coherent overview on what situation coordination 
is about, and how interagency cooperation works. 
 
6.1 Critique 
As with all research, also this thesis has to be evaluated critically. There are especially three 
aspects I want to concentrate on: the writer and the related ethics, the methodology, and the 
references. I will focus on the writer, the research and the report first, the review the used 
methodology, and conclude this section with the used references. 
Indeed, as was discussed in this thesis, all people have background and previous experience 
and knowledge that affects how the issues are seen and understood. The previous experience 
is reflected upon how we perceive the phenomenon, and in this case how I understand inter-
agency cooperation. I have previously worked at the Finnish Customs for 20 months, which 
may cause bias on the research results. The bias could occur in two ways: what I wanted to 
say and find from the data, and how I perceived the Customs’ role. It was evident in the rec-
orded interviews and the questions asked in addition to the ones in Appendix 1 that I was in-
terested in the Customs, but my aim was to study the data as objectively as possible. Still, 
there is a possibility that it had an influence in the results as well. Also, as a former authority I 
feel the biasness might also extends to other authorities, especially in assessing the possible 
failures in action, as in general there is no need to questions other authorities’ decisions. As a 
researcher this is a problem as all findings whether they are desirable or not should be report-
ed, and still the researcher has to remain faithful for the research results. 
In reference to the legal anchorage, it should be taken into account that I have not studied law. 
Therefore all legal references should be considered as my interpretations of the law. However, 
at all stages I have concentrated in interpreting it to the word, and also to reference it as it is. 
An additional aspect is provided by the fact that not all laws used in this thesis were available 
in English, but had to be translated. The translations were done by me, which reveals another 
subject that has to be noted in the next paragraph. While law should be understandable to the 
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general public, without proper training some interpretations may be too vague or too precise. 
In any case they have been reviewed carefully many times during the process, also by the su-
pervisors and the interviewed authorities. Yet, the responsibility and interpretations are mine 
alone. 
Without the proper education of a linguist, the translations of the law, as well as the inter-
views, might not provide the same meaning as to what was originally written. I also am not a 
native English speaker even though my professional language has been English for three (3) 
years. I also studied my high school in the International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme 
(IB), which provided me a strong understanding in spoken and written English. Still, regard-
less of my best intentions and effort the terminology and meanings needs to be addressed as 
written by a person with English as her second language. An additional resource has been the 
University’s linguist with whom I have had the opportunity to discuss and review parts of the 
thesis.  
As stated earlier in Chapter 2 of this thesis, interagency cooperation as well as all research 
where authorities are studied will risk approaching confidentiality. As theses generally are 
public, I have taken the confidentiality into account by agreeing with all interviewees that the 
content is checked, so that no confidential information regarding their own organization is left 
to the thesis. In practice this is conducted by sending the thesis to a review round in March 
2016 to all interviewees. After the feedback it is taken into account and the risky sections 
amended. Still, as the combination of information could have some restricted material, so the 
thesis review round extends and advise was sought from a representative of the Secretariat of 
the Security Committee. The Committee was selected as they are responsible for promoting 
and coordinating cross-administrative security preparedness. This heavy review process po-
tentially affects the phenomenon and the analysis of the data, and thus has to be acknowl-
edged.  
As to evaluating the methodological choices critically, they are assessed in the next few para-
graphs. The thematic interviews were a logical and very typical choice for data collection both 
in qualitative research in general, and when phenomenography is the method for analysis. 
However, as a research method it should be also observed critically. The interviewees may 
provide information that is bias or what they believe the interviewer wants to hear. Also, in 
some cases the situation may be intimidating. These factors all alter the data, which ultimately 
affects the study. The interview situations were all designed to be as normal as possible, 
which was especially important with the two unconventional interviews that were conducted 
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by phone and the teleconference application. With the special aspects of the interviews it cre-
ates a real possibility for amended results. While there is no way of being completely sure, the 
review round amongst all participating agencies did not reveal any anomalies, or questions as 
to what other agencies’ representatives had stated. Still, this also could be assumed as the rep-
resentatives were asked to check whether there was anything that should be classified, rather 
than focusing on the validity or truthiness of the data.  
As to the interviewees and why I asked these people, it was because they were involved in the 
case in a similar position in comparison to one another. In this case they were the logical 
choice, and provided good information from and equal perspective. However, by choosing 
individual interviews instead of a group interview, I believe I received more in-depth infor-
mation with this method. In a group interviews situation the more quiet people may have been 
left to the background whereas the more extrovert people would control the situation. The 
individual interviews ensured that all voices were heard, and enabled that even the more un-
comfortable opinions and experiences as indicating the possible mistakes other people made 
could be said.  
Indeed, the interview process could have been designed differently. The initial interview 
could have been designed to collect preliminary information on the perceptions and on the 
case. If a second round of interviews had been arranged, the data could have been analyzed 
and additional information gained. This way there could have been even deeper understanding 
on the interagency cooperation phenomenon. However, the second round was not conducted 
mainly because of the researcher’s time limitations, which can be seen as a defect of this the-
sis.  
The case study research method usually requires more than one types of data collection meth-
ods. In this thesis the only method for data collection was interviews. Observations, which in 
addition to the interviews, is a common method in case study research, was not an option due 
to the time passed from the case. Also, as a group interview was not arranged, the interview-
ees’ personal relations could not be observed and analysed. Still, as the personal relations 
were not the primary focus of this thesis, I do not see the latter being a significant factor when 
the validity of this study is evaluated. However, the fact that only one data collection method 
was used does question whether the research strategy was implemented and conducted 
properly. Indeed, if the case study method had been the only guideline and framework for this 
thesis it would be a very valid question. However, as the case study provided the framework 
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for the phenomenographical analysis and the structure for the case presented in section 4.1, it 
should not affect significantly the validity of this thesis. 
Phenomenography is affected by the researcher’s own personal experience as much as the 
interviewees’ experience. In practice this means that should the same data be collected by 
someone else, or only analyzed with the same methodology as what was done in this thesis, 
the results would likely differ from one another. While the results should show similarities, 
the nuances are dependent on the personal experience, and hence will result into differences. 
All in all, the same issues arise with all qualitative research methods, creating a unique aspect 
in each study, while still maintaining a perception worth acknowledging.  
Phenomenography is also subject to criticism as it strives to understand the perceptions. They 
are subjective, and very much dependent on the context. Hence, the results are not generaliza-
ble, as there cannot be two exactly the same situations in which the data is collected and the 
experienced gained. However, when combined with a case study approach this issue can part-
ly be dismissed. By comparing the perceptions in relation to the cases, the cases and their suc-
cesses could be compared.  
As to reviewing the references citically, a few aspects need to be taken into account. Firstly 
the interviews are reviewed with a special attention directed at the time between the 
interviews and when the case happened. Then, the case as a research method is discussed, 
after which the interviews, questionnaire and the additional data via email. 
The core data for this thesis was collected with eight individual interviews. As a method, it 
proved to be successful for gaining the interviewees subjective opinions on interagency 
cooperation in the Thor Liberty case. However, since the interview situations varien from one 
another, a possibility of variations within the answers remain. Two of the interviews were 
conducted by not meeting the interviewee, but by using a telephone and the Microsoft Lync-
application. The variation with the lack of face-to-face interaction could possibly result into 
the interviewee discussing the case with a bias. However, the discussion within all the 
interviews was free, and as my understanding as a researcher compiled on the case, the 
additional querstions could be directed to the more comprehensive path. The aim was to be as 
objective and open as possible in all situations regardless of the interview method.  
Another anomalie was the sumpplementary questionnaire sent to the Customs. The initial 
interview with the Customs representatives was unfinished because of tight timeschedules. 
The written questions provided the interviewees time to think how to answer the questions, 
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leaving out the spontaniety that a free discussion on a face-to-face interview enables. The 
answers were still processed the same way as everything else, and thus coincide with the data 
set. Yet, this anomalie might create unnecessary and unwanted objectivity to the answers, and 
might affect the end result. Also, it enabled the respondent to think how the issues are 
discussed and what opinions and how they are expressed. Hence, they had a unique 
opportunity to affect on the research results. 
The answers were the subjective perceptions of the interviewees on the Thor Liberty case. 
Thus, the data cannot be used to generalize how interagency cooperation works somewhere 
else. A significant aspect in this is that the personal relationships or chemistry affects how the 
case is perceived, as was also evident in the research results. While the subjectivity comple-
mented the research method perfectly it does not provide an objective understanding on the 
phenomenon. 
The incident happened in 2011-2012. Since the study is conducted in 2015-2016, it should be 
stated that some nuances have been forgotten. It was also stated by many, if not all, of the 
interviewees. Some interviewees had taken their case notes with them, where as some pursued 
to remember the case from the relevant parts. This is a relevant factor as it may affect the per-
ception of the interviewees as well as the accuracy of dates, incidents, processes, and so on. 
Also, as the rotation of tasks in some involved organisations is two to three years, and they 
might have already had two assignments since the studied incident, meaning that the details 
are assumed to be blurred. Interestingly some interviewees also stated that the Thor Liberty 
case was not a significant incident, where as to other organisations it was the complete oppo-
site. Due to these differences in the perceptions, the memories of the incidents may have even 
greater variation and should be assessed when the case is reviewed as a whole. 
Another issue that needs to be addressed is that Valtonen’s Fundamental Characteristics may 
have had an unintentional influence in the phenomenographical categorization. It is as with 
empiricism: knowledge it based and built upon the previous knowledge and experiences. The 
theoretical framework was completed before the analysis began, providing a possibility of 
bias. However, as phenomenography is affected by both the data subject’s and the research-
er’s experiences and perceptions, these possible biases are almost, if not completely, impossi-
ble to avoid. Thus, when evaluating the reliability and validity of the results it has to be taken 
into account.  
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6.2 Further research topics  
As stated many times before, interagency cooperation is a complex phenomenon. It could be 
studied from many angles, and even the same data could be used to do many other studies. 
This thesis concentrates on the experiences and perceptions on cooperation due to the limited 
space, time and requirements of a master’s thesis, but many other aspects would have been 
interesting as well. Here are some topics for further research, however it should be acknowl-
edged that this data was collected for this study alone, and thus cannot be used by anyone else 
than me. However, should someone gain access to similar data or think about what could be 
studied on interagency cooperation, hopefully this section will rise some thoughts.  
 
Media played a big role in this case, and was also a major factor in why I became interested in 
the Thor Liberty case. One approach I also pondered when trying to decide what to concen-
trate on was communication. The difference between what the authorities communicated to 
the media, and what the media communicated to the general public appeared significant. It 
was already clear with the media review and the interviews that they differ significantly from 
one another. By involving media representatives and approaching the research problem from 
the media research discipline, an interesting study on the communication and miscommunica-
tion of the authorities could be conducted.  
 
This thesis is a qualitative study on interagency cooperation. The results show the different 
perception on how interagency cooperation works. It would be interesting to conduct a quanti-
tative research within the participated organizations with, for example, the Delphi method to 
gain a wider understanding on the phenomenon. With the quantitative data it would be possi-
ble to make careful generalizations. The results could provide a tool to further develop inter-
agency cooperation.  
 
Interagency cooperation could be studied as a sociological case. Even in this case there were 
two small groups, which were related to the two cases. Also, unconventional groups due to 
the personal relations occurred. This approach could answer Why interagency cooperation 
works, in addition to the How as Valtonen and myself have done.  
 
Yet another possible further research topic would be a case study comparison. My suggestion 
is to conduct a series of case studies by using the same approach on similar cases. Indeed, the 
results would be somewhat comparable, and the phenomenon could be further analyzed. The 
difficulties with this approach is that, as stated before, the data collection might face difficul-
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ties due to the restricted nature of the operational work of authorities. Also, to find cases that 
are comparable might prove challenging. Still, the comparison could help understand why 
interagency cooperation works, and to verify for example Valtonen’s research. 
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
- How did Thor Liberty’s case proceed / evolve?  
- When did you / your organization get involved, and who contacted you?  
- What was your role with the case?? 
- When did your role end? 
- In your opinion, how did interagency cooperation work between you and other authorities? 
How about between other authorities? And as a whole? 
- What was successful with interagency cooperation, and what would you improve? Please 
elaborate. 
- Who had the overall situation command? 
- How was information exchange managed?  
- All in all 11 authorities were involved in the case. Were there too many entities involved? 
Was some entity missing? Please specify.  
- Had you prepared for such incidents as the Thor Liberty case?  
- How would you grade interagency cooperation with the scale from 4-10, 10 being the best? 
- If you were to do this again, so that you already had the experience from this case, is there 
anything you would do differently?  
- What is the role of personal relationships / chemistry in interagency cooperation? 
- What is the role of trust in interagency cooperation?  
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APPENDIX 2: TIMELINE OF THE THOR LIBERTY CASE 
 
Date Authority Law, if applicable 
   
15.12 Trafi informs the Fire and 
Rescue Department 
Trafi was called in due to it being the supervisory authority 
responsible for the safety in vessels (Laki alusturvallisuuden 
valvonnasta 370/1995, §5).  
 F&R D  Fire and Rescue Department was called in according to the 
Rescue act §2, as it is obliged to prevent fires and other 
accidents. 
 Trafi seized the vessel According to law, Trafi has to stop the vessel should there 
be any anomalities in it’s safety (§12). Trafi is also the 
supervisory authority with loose cargo (Laki eräiden 
irtolastialusten turvallisesta lastaamisesta ja lastin 
purkamisesta1206/2004, §15). 
17.12 F&R D informs the Safety 
Investigations Authority 
Since there was a threat of a large scale accident, the Fire 
and Rescue Department notified the Safety Investigations 
Authority. Turvallisuustutkintalaki 525/2011 §2 
 F&R D informed the Local 
Police / Public order and 
safety 
The Police was called in to oversee the public order and 
safety and to evaluate if a crime has been committed. 
Poliisilaki 872/2011 §1 
 F&R D informed the Border 
Guard’s Maritime 
Command Center. The 
Patrol boat is commanded to 
sail to Kotka. 
According to the Act on Border Guard 578/2005 §22 and 
§26 the Border Guard is obliged to assist the Fire and 
Rescue Department in rescue services when asked and the 
Police in public order and safety tasks when asked 
18.12 F&R D contacts the Finnish 
Defence Forces to identify 
the explosives 
The rescue act 379/2011 states in §46, 2 that the Finnish 
Defence Forces is obliged to provide executive assistance by 
means of expertise, resources and equipment should it be 
requested.  
19.12 First situation management 
meeting. Attending entities: 
F&R D, BG, Trafi, DF, SIA, 
Health District. Overall 
command to the F&R D. 
The first hoint meeting was held on Mondaty December 
19th, and the forst press conference was held then as well. 
The F&R D assumed overall situation command on the 
rescue situation, as is laid down by law in the Rescue Act 
(Pelastuslaki 379/2011 §35) 
 A secure zone on land and 
sea is formed, 1000m in all 
directions 
Enforced by the F&R D, ecexuted by the local Police 
on land (Pelastuslaki 379/2011, §46, 4) and by BG on 
sea (Rajavartiolaki 578/2005, §26) 
20.12 Police Criminal 
Investigation and the Chief 
Inspector joined the case 
Explosives were stowed against the international 
maritime legislation 
 Finnish Customs inspection 
on the missile containers 
Tullilaki 1466/1994 §3 
21.12 Additional Customs 
Inspection, seize of missiles 
Tullilaki 1466/1994, §14. Unauthorized military equipment (Laki 
puolustustarvikkeiden maastaviennistä ja kauttakuljetuksesta 
242/1990, §1), Unauthorized dual-use substances (Laki kaksikäyt-
tötuotteiden vientivalvonnasta 562/1996, §2) 
 Missiles transferred to a 
secure place in 
cooperation with the 
Police and the NDF 
 
23.12 Airspace 1000m from Thor 
Liberty is closed 
Enforced by Trafi in accordance with the Aviation act 
(Ilmailulaki 1194/2009 §8) 
 Stowing of the explosives 
begins 
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26.12 Stowing complete, closing 
of airspace discontinued,  
 
 Trafi reverses the seize of 
the explosives 
 
 The F&R D declares:large-
scale emergency situation 
reduced to an emergency 
situation 
 
4.1 Release of the missiles by 
the Ministry of Defence 
 
6.1 Thor Liberty sails away  
 
 
